FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-182
Wednesday
20 September 1995

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CONTENTS

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ALBANIA

Effect of Berisha's U.S. Visit on Nano Case *[POPULLI PO 17 Sep]* 1
Parliament Nominates New EU Delegation *[Editorial Report]* 1
Parliament Speaker Wields Power Against Brozi *[Editorial Report]* 2
Interior Minister Seen as Court 'Scapegoat' *[ALEANCA 15 Sep]* 3
Brozi: Government's Demand Is 'Tendentious' *[Editorial Report]* 3
Cassation Court Plenum Ruled 'Unconstitutional' *[Tirana Radio]* 4

BULGARIA

New 'Pro-Islamic' U.S., NATO Policy Viewed *[KONTINENT 14 Sep]* 5
Pirinski Returns From Visit to Bratislava *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Videnov Describes Gas Supply Deals With Russia *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Videnov Allegedly Concentrating Power in BSP *[TRUD 8-10 Aug]* 6

CZECH REPUBLIC

Uhde Briefs Journalists on Perry Talks, NATO *[Prague Radio]* 14
Klaus on Coalition, Currency Convertibility *[Prague Radio]* 14

SLOVAKIA

Government Calls For President's Resignation *[Bratislava Radio]* 16
Spokesman Explains Kovac Refusal To Attend Meeting *[Bratislava Radio]* 16
Carnogursky on SIS Role in Kovac Jr. Kidnapping *[NARODNA OBRODA 13 Sep]* 17
Foreign Minister Departs for Belarus *[Bratislaava Radio]* 17
Defense Minister Leaves for Talks in Turkey *[Bratislava TV]* 18
EBRD Official Views Failed Mochovce Talks *[PRAVDA 16 Sep]* 18

HUNGARY

Serbs Laying Mines Close to Border *[Budapest Radio]* 20
Parliament Approves Air Defense Modernization Plan *[Budapest Radio]* 20
Activity, Prospects of Paks Nuclear Power Station *[NEPSZABADSAG 16 Sep]* 20
MIEP Campaigns Against Energy Privatization *[Budapest Radio]* 21
Demonstrators Protest Romanian Education Law *[NEPSZABADSAG 18 Sep]* 21

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Izetbegovic, Tudjman Joint Decisions 23
Agree on 'Liberated Territories' *[AFP]* 23
Issue Banja Luka Pledge *[AFP]* 23
Sacirbegovic: Army Will Not Enter Banja Luka *[AFP]* 23
Bildt Sees NATO, Russian Troops Replacing UN *[AFP]* 23
UN: Army, Croats Control 60-65 Percent of Land *[AFP]* 24
UN: Serbs Continue Gun Withdrawal From Sarajevo *[AFP]* 24
Serb Expulsion of Non-Serbs From Banja Luka *[AFP]* 24
Delic Cited on Changed Situation in Bosnia *[London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 19 Sep]* 25
Dudakovic Sees War Ending by Year-End *[Sarajevo Radio]* 25
Croats Launch Offensive Across Sava River *[AFP]* 26
Article Sets Down Conditions for Settlement *[OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) 5 Sep]* 26
Karadzic: Enemy 'Must Be Stopped Militarily' *[TANJUG]* 27
'Public Announcement' by Karadzic's Office *[Banja Luka Radio]* 28
Koljevic Says Serbs Will Defend Banja Luka *[AFP]* 28
Koljevic Expects Cessation of Hostilities *[TANJUG]* 28
Krajisnik Questions Rifkind's Decision To Mediate *[SRNA]* 29
Serb Assembly President Krajisnik Interviewed *[Pale TV]* 29
SGV Appeal to UN To Stop Serb 'Exodus' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 32
Bosnian Serbs Worry About Redrawing of Borders 32
Plavsic Accuses Croatia *[AFP]* 32
Croats, Muslims Using NATO *[TANJUG]* 33
SGV Urges Banja Luka Serbs To Negotiate *[Sarajevo Radio]* 33
Daily Investigates Mladic's Hospitalization *[NASA BORBA 19 Sep]* 34
NATO Seen as Having German 'Militant Ambitions' *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 12 Sep]* 34

CROATIA

Joint Statement on Bosnia-Croatia-U.S. Talks *[Zagreb TV]* 36
Tudjman: Eastern Slavonia Problem Must Be Solved *[Zagreb Radio]* 36
Granic: 'Right Time To Bring the War to an End' *[Zagreb Radio]* 37
Russia's Ivanov Says Time for Peace in Bosnia *[Zagreb Radio]* 37
Russian Ambassador Urges Peace in Srem-Baranya *[TANJUG]* 37
Peaceful Reintegration of Eastern Slavonia Rejected *[NASA BORBA 18 Sep]* 38
Emergency Procedure To Expedite Election Law *[Zagreb Radio]* 38
Commentary Doubts Western Course of Democracy *[NOVI LIST 14 Sep]* 38
HDZ's 'Operation Marjan' Against Opposition *[FERAL TRIBUNE 28 Aug]* 39

POLAND

3d Presidential Candidate Applies for Registration *[Warsaw TV]* 43
SLD Leader on Campaign, Coalition *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 15 Sep]* 43
Catholic Church Fears SLD Win in Election *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 19 Sep]* 46
Solidarity Urges Prevention of Electoral Fraud *[Warsaw Radio]* 48

ROMANIA

NAA Head 'Perplexed' About PRM in Government *[ROMANIA LIBERA 15 Sep]* 49
Government Approves Army Budget Cuts for 1995 *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 12 Sep]* 49
Problems With Legal, Illegal Immigrants *[AZI 14 Jul]* 49

SLOVENIA

Slovene, Croatian Leaders Discuss 'Open Issues' *[Zagreb Radio]* 53
Thaler: Separate Talks on Property, Minorities *[Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA 15 Sep]* 53

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

Holbrooke Comments on Talks With Milosevic *[Belgrade Radio]* 54
Milosevic's Office on Talks *[Belgrade Radio]* 54
Belgrade: NATO To Influence Croatians, Muslims *[TANJUG]* 54
Milutinovic, Agnelli on Progress in Peace Process *[Belgrade TV]* 54

Serbia

SPO Asks Milosevic To Halt Enemy Offensive *[SRNA]* 55
Seselj To Hold Anti-Milosevic Rally on 21 Sep *[SRNA]* 55
Group of 1,261 Krajina Serb Refugees Arrives *[TANJUG]* 56
Vojvodina Hungarians Receive Threatening Leaflets *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 19 Sep]* 56
'Speculation' Over Mladic's Whereabouts *[AFP]* 57
Commentary on Consequences of NATO Air Strikes *[DNEVNIK 16 Sep]* 57

Effect of Berisha's U.S. Visit on Nano Case

AU1909143995 Tirana POPULLI PO in Albanian 17 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by A. Pista: "Berisha-Clinton Meeting and the Cliches of Courtesy—America and the Lifeblood of Nano and Berisha"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Albanian President Berisha's visit to the United States has come to an end, and the journey has involved many problems. In Albania, the visit has been discussed mainly in terms of the novelties the Clinton-Berisha meeting might bring. Since it is the first time that a U.S. president has issued an invitation to an Albanian president, it fell to Berisha to take part in a historic meeting. Although Berisha had previously met former president Bush, this could not be called a real official meeting between the leaders of the United States and Albania.

Berisha was above all else kept in a state of tension as he began his visit to the United States. The events at the Court of Cassation created a dangerous precedent of a failure to preserve the total independence of the judiciary and showed that the state was more than ever before inclined to intervene in its own favor whenever it thought necessary. However, more than a pure move against the independence of the courts, the Brozi case is involved in the Nano case.

The Socialist Party chairman has been kept in prison for two years and all the statements by the leaders of the ruling party have called him a former official of the old nomenklatura who must be punished for having permitted Italian aid for Albania to be misappropriated in favor of certain Italian citizens. There are two question marks over this charge. President Berisha, in an interview for the American network CNN, stated that Nano was sentenced for embezzlement. In fact, the leader of the largest opposition party never faced this charge. President Berisha then stated at a news conference that he would only pardon convicted persons on the occasion of national or religious holidays. Logic of this kind leads one to think that Berisha is now persuaded that Fatos Nano must leave behind his prison walls and be incorporated in the country's political life. However, his guilt, even if pardoned, would not permit such a thing. Nano would not have the right to stand as a candidate for the post of People's Assembly deputy, let alone president of the republic. However, one important fact is above all in the favor of the Socialist Party chairman. The Rome court has conclusively closed the investigations of the Italian deliverers of aid for Albania. Of those who delivered this aid, not a single person is still accused of theft or embezzlement. Zef Brozi, as a lawyer who until recently was in two minds over Nano's guilt or innocence, has realized this. However, it is this very thing that has upset his relations with the state. Some layers of officialdom have been found ready to cast aspersions on Brozi, to attack him, and pull own his authority. It was under such circumstances that the siege of the Court of Cassation took place, something intolerable to democratic practices anywhere in the world. It was on these grounds that Brozi expressed his amazement at what Berisha would say on his visit to President Clinton. Berisha said that the maximum separation of powers in Albania has been achieved. However, in Tirana the Council of Ministers has sent to the Constitutional Court a suit against the plenum of the Court of Cassation. This same Council of Ministers said nothing in July when the plenum of the Court of Cassation was silent over the decision to postpone the plenum to September, because the Appeal Court had not forwarded the file. However, Berisha's visit lay ahead and the government pressed its suit immediately after the Albanian president met Clinton. Such a game is being played with only a single aim, to keep in jail Fatos Nano, the leader of the Albanian opposition and a man who is being unjustly held in prison. In this rigmarole, Brozi is merely a cog, but a man who came out against Berisha and in favor of Nano at a certain time. War has now been openly declared between the two Albanian political leaders and both are trying to gain as much ground as possible. Of course, it is more difficult for Nano because he is both in the opposition and in prison. However, bearing in mind that he will come to power tomorrow because of Berisha's serious mistakes, this is no great handicap.

The United States has not left any particular effect on either. It has been used as a pretext for both Nano and Berisha to freeze the tensions of Albanian politics, before they resume their long struggle in the future.

Parliament Nominates New EU Delegation

AU1909200495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana KOHA JONE, RILINDJA, GAZETA SHQIPTARE, POPULLI PO, on 14 September carry commentaries on front pages, totaling 1,500 words, on parliament's decision to nominate a new EU delegation.

KOHA JONE writes that yesterday's plenary session was "more a meeting of the Democratic Party (PD) group rather than a plenary session. This happened because, as is already known, the deputies of the four opposition parties—the Socialist Party (PS), the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance, and the Right Democratic Party—boycotted the proceedings in protest against the majority's refusal of the urgent demand to call Prime Minister Meksi to explain recent

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events in the Cassation Court." The newspaper goes on to say that after a series of laws was passed, the permanent parliamentary delegation to the EU was discussed, adding that "Pjeter Arbnori (speaker of parliament) was appointed head of the Albanian delegation, Ali Spahia (head of the PD parliamentary group) the deputy head; Namik Dokle (head of the PS parliamentary group) and Ruzhdi Pulaha from the Social Democratic Party were appointed as members." In absence of one of the above, "they will be replaced by Rushem Golemi (PD) and Eduard Selami (PD). Other parties will make their respective appointments in case of absences," the commentary says. He goes on: "Eduard Selami, former PD leader, has again become a 'victim' of his own parliamentary group." He comments: "As is already known, Selami was considered persona non grata for the PD and for President Berisha because of his ideas for the approval of the Constitution." He was later discharged from all his functions and neglected, and this was done after Albania was accepted in the EU, says the commentary, adding that "Selami made an important contribution as a member of the Albanian delegation" and that his earlier removal might cause problems, even "refusal to accept Albania." His merits are still recognized by his group and "this was also seen yesterday when all the deputies approved his appointment unanimously." GAZETA SHQIPTARE publishes an interview by A. Cani with Selami asking the reasons for his replacement. Selami replies that: "Only those who did such a thing know why. I do not see anything rational in such an act. I would like to say that all this is the continuation of the political struggle waged against me by the leading clan within the PD that started last March." To the question whether the Democratic Party is split, Selami replied that "I do not think that at the moment the PD is split, but a deep rupture exists between the leading clan and the PD grass roots. It is a fact that the parliamentary group has not always obeyed the present leading staff, showing a kind of independence."

RILINDJA says that the "most disputable candidature" was that of Namik Dokle (PS deputy chairman). Their opposition had to do with Dokle's several declarations before and after Albania's admittance in the EU, which were considered antinational by the voters.

POPULLI PO cites Arbnori to have said that "this has nothing to do with Selami's replacement but his return to former positions." According to the deputies of the majority, "Selami was at the head of the Albanian delegation only because he replaced the speaker of the parliament, Mr. Arbnori, who was very busy at that time," the newspaper reads in conclusion.

Parliament Speaker Wields Power Against Brozi
AU1909200195

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana KOHA JONE, GAZETA SHQIPTARE, ZERI I POPULLIT, and POPULLI PO on 14 September carry on pages 2 and 3 correspondents' reports and commentaries, totaling 1,000 words on the letter the speaker of the parliament, Arbnori sent to the Cassation Court.

ZERI I POPULLIT and POPULLI PO publish the six-point letter in full. In it, Arbnori reminds Cassation Court Chairman Brozi that there is "no police seige around the Cassation Court," that he has "forgotten his dependence on the law," that he tries "to come above the legislature," that he "has in his administration former secret police and opposes laws against their dissmissal," that he "is involved in politics," that he "has a wrong image of the legislature's tolerance to him" and ends "now even part of the deputies who have supported you, have changed their opinion." The newspaper comments: "What we can read between the lines is that the state power is determined in its struggle against the independence of justice. To carry this adventure to the end, Pjeter Arbnori and others above and below him, have even been equipped with apparatuses that can read the minds of the deputies before a possible voting."

Frrok Cupi comments in KOHA JONE that the letter to the Cassation Court was signed by "Speaker of Parliament Pjeter Arbnori, who poses as one of the most outstanding politicians, of course, always under the shadow of the President of the Republic, Berisha."

The commentary describes Arbnori, saying that he is one of the most disputable figures among the politicians, not for his involvement in corruption because he has been mentioned but once in the legislature when Deputy Azem Hajdari, the student leader of December events, asked to know how much Arbnori got in per diem during his trips abroad. He is mostly discussed for his background, "his father was in the service of fascism," and he has been accused by other prisoners for giving out "information in prison" and because during the legislature's sessions "he is very fierce against the deputies other than the Democratic Party deputies, especially against the socialists."

Cupi says that in his letter Arbnori expresses his "unrestrained anger against the one who does not kowtow to the political and executive power." He goes on that if Arbnori would have considered what was discussed in the Clinton-Berisha meeting and the American ideas on democracy, perhaps "he would not have signed this letter," adding that "Arbnori's concept of democracy and that of some other politicians vested

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with power is that it is a toy in their hands." In conclusion he says that the last sentence of the letter, shows that "the political power has taken measures to number votes as it wishes. Or that the votes have been prejudged either by Arbnori or someone above him. Or that the speaker of the parliament offends the parliament members by prejudging their votes or by implying that their votes are bought by the administrative power. Everything comes to the same thing: threat to the elected part and to the judicial part of power. Democracy does not exist and this is the loudest alarm bell."

Interior Minister Seen as Court 'Scapegoat'

AU1909200695 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 15 Sep 95 p 3

[Commentary by M. Tanushi: "The Cassation Court Can Be Sacrificed on the Democratic Party's Table"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A few days before flying to the United States, to the country where law and independence of justice are observed above all, President Berisha switched on all the batteries of the executive power against the judicial one. For the second time, Cassation Court Chairman Zef Brozi found himself unexpectedly in the face of attacks by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, the Constitutional Court, and the entire government. Surrounded lastly by the police, police cars, and National Informatin Service cars, Brozi had to stay inside the Cassation Court building. Wearing a black tunic and surrounded by journalists, deputies, representatives of political parties, and foreign diplomats, he was determined to defend the judicial system he represents to the end. In the meantime, the bitter taste of this unprecedented event flew to the United States along with Berisha, whose consequences Berisha himself had to confront first. Reported by the mass media, the institution of justice and the Cassation Court did not go unnoticed in Washington. Not accidentally the CNN reporter, in her interview, mentioned to Berisha the words "justice," "Cassation," and "Nano." Reactions have also come from the Council of Europe which announced that next week two experts will come to Albania to see to the "Cassation" question. Berisha knows that this is more than a warning.

Under these conditions, Berisha preferred to withdraw momentarily. Police in uniforms withdrew from the Cassation building, and the executive power is trying to convince the public that nothing has happened. Arbnori, speaker of parliament, replied to Brozi, threatening and warning him, reminding him what can happen to obstinate individuals. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court chairman illegally pronounces himself in favor of the government. The deputy minister of interior hastens to give the lie to the fact that the Cassation Court was surrounded by police, forgetting that the day the seige began, he was there at the head of the police forces, and that his ministry admitted in a statement that there were police, but they were sent there to stop the three employees who had been dismissed by Minister Frasheri a day earlier from entering the building. All of this mess, conducted so very badly by the Democratic Party, will not end here. With every passing day, Brozi feels stronger in the face of the savageness of state power, determined to defend the dignity of the judge. The state power has thought of the loss, but every loss needs a scapegoat. Sources from within the Democratic Party say that the scapegoat has already been pinpointed and he will be the minister of interior himself. In the beginning, rumors spread that he knew nothing about the siege of the Cassation Court, but later in parliament he admitted that he knows "about the activities of the police he directs." It is most likely that this statement makes Berisha pour all his old anger on him. No one believes Berisha when he says that he knew nothing about the surrounding of the Cassation Court; no one can stop him from telling the contrary. Musaraj, minister of interior, unduly unloaded the weapon he could defend himself with. Let's wait and see whether he has other "weapons" to use at the right moment.

Brozi: Government's Demand Is 'Tendentious'

AU1909200795

[FBIS Editorial Report] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT on 16 September carries on page six the Cassation Court chairman's reply to the Meksi government, totaling 1500 words, under the title: "The Demand of the Meksi Government Is Tendentious and Has Very Bad Intentions."

In his reply, Cassation Court Chairman Brozi says, "We are sending our opinions and remarks concerning the government's demand and the preliminary demands of the Constitutional Court." He goes on to say that the demand of the Meksi government is "anticonstitutional" and "an attempt by the executive and political power to put under its control the judiciary in general and the Cassation Court in particular," adding that "neither the constitutional provisions nor other laws give competence to the Council of Ministers or to the Ministry of Justice to control the Cassation Court." He continues to say, "The demand of the government distorts many truths, and it carries a lot of untruths and falsifications," mentioning many examples of it. Brozi mentions the fact that while he has been accused by the government of many suspended cases, the truth is: "The balance of suspensions by the decision of the Cassation Court and the files examined by the legal sector for 1995 is 105 out of 4,261," adding that for this falsification he may demand penalty

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but, "I think that Albania is in need of a stable government." The demand is "tendentious and with very mean intentions" and that "to achieve its aim to dismiss the Cassation Court chairman, several state and political mechanisms are resorting to all means, even unconstitutinal, dishonest, illegal, and untrue ones.

"Is Meksi's government not worried by the fact that in many cases, verdicts are not executed because high state and party officials, mayors, and leading members of different institutions and police stations interfere? Letters come to the Cassation Court from the Presidency, the People's Assembly, ministers, the Democratic Party, the National Informaton Service, etc., on several cases. I think it brings no good if I will be obliged to use them as a testimony against them." Brozi gives further evidence of flagrant violations of the decisions of the Cassation Court adding that "the demand of the government testifies to professional mediocrity, pronounced shortcomings of the Ministry of Justice."

Cassation Court Plenum Ruled 'Unconstitutional'

AU1909183595 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Report by Rezear Xhaxhiu]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Begin Constitutional Court Chairman Gjata recording] On the basis of Article 24, Point 3, and Article 25 of Law No. 7,561 dated 29 April 1991, on Some Amendments to Supplement Law 7,491 dated 29 April 1991, On Main Constitutional Provisions, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Albania unanimously decided:

To abrogate as unconstitutional the decision by the Court of Cassation Plenum, dated 26 July 1995, to consider the demands for a legality defense of penal cases after 31 July 1995. [end recording]

[Xhaxhiu] This was the decision given at 1430 today by Constitutional Court Chairman Rustem Gjata at the end of the trial on the constitutionality of the Court of Cassation Plenum. Held only two days ago, the trial in question examined the suit that the Albanian Government filed to this court regarding the constitutionality of the Court of Cassation Plenum.

At today's decision, Rustem Gjata argued, based on judicial terminology, what he called antilaw and anticonstitution. According to Gjata, the decision of 26 July by the Court of Cassation Plenum to examine the Nano case in September is antilegal and anticonstitutional, as with the approval of the new Code of the Penal Procedure, effective 1 August, a demand to defend lawfulness as an extraordinary means at the exclusive competence of the Court of Cassation Chairman is not anticipated and [words indistinct] the Court of Cassation Plenum as the highest chain in the judicial field. Gjata stressed that two constitutional provisions have been violated and that the new law is effective also toward procedural relations that have arisen before the law came into effect for cases [words indistinct] or in the process, with the exclusion of cases when [words indistinct]. [Words indistinct] Rustem Gjata, the plenum did not legislate to decide on the continuity of its existence after 31 July 1995 and the value of the extraordinary means to attack decisions in conformity with the Code of Penal Procedure.

At the end of the session, Hektor Frasheri, justice minister and the representative of the government in this process, considered the decision as based on law.

[Begin Frasheri recording] The demand was based on law and judicial logic, and the decision was also based on logic and law. It was a very-well-based decision. [end recording]

[Xhaxhiu] Meanwhile, Nano's attorney, as a party in this trial, had accentuated reserves toward the decision in question, but also toward the trial in general.

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New 'Pro-Islamic' U.S., NATO Policy Viewed

AU1909145195 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 14 Sep 95 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Kostov: "Is This What 'Partnership for Peace' Means?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even a blind man can see that, in recent weeks, NATO has adopted a new policy line on the conflict in Bosnia. The new line differs in depreciating the political efforts to resolve the conflict, giving priority to the use of armed force. Of course, it is claimed that this force is applied solely to facilitate a political solution. In international relations, they always say this when force is used, do they not?

NATO's shift to the new strong line comes as no surprise. Long ago, from the very outset of the conflict, in fact, the powerful pro-Islamic lobby in the United States called upon Washington and NATO to choose the strong-arm policy in Bosnia, by openly taking sides in the conflict, without any provisos. The pro-Islamic lobby was aware from the very beginning that this is the only way to realize its scheme for creating an Islamic state in Bosnia.

After years of fighting between the various lobbies to gain the upper hand in influencing Washington's official policy, it appears that the pro-Islamic lobby has won. As a consequence, NATO, as it can be seen, is already conducting actual military operations on the side of the pro-Islamic government in Bosnia.

Will this victory of the pro-Islamic lobby in Washington, and hence in NATO, be a lasting one? Will the European states, Russia especially, reconcile themselves to this shift in NATO and U.S. policy? How will the change affect the further development of the Bosnian conflict? At the moment, it is impossible to answer these questions.

However, there is one question that we, as a Balkan nation and state, should ask ourselves and find an answer, because this question concerns our national security, existence, and dignity. This is the question of our participation in the "Partnership for Peace [PFP]." Are these the conditions—the real conditions—for our membership? Are they the conditions that we see during the implementation by the United States and NATO of their new strong-arm policy in Bosnia? Can anyone claim that this shift in policy regarding the conflict there does not concern us? Whether it concerns you or not, it does represent a direct threat to us, together with the entire Balkans! The application of this new policy of settling the conflict by force threatens the future of the Balkans, whatever the immediate result is in the next few months.

Very well, since it is evident that NATO has a new policy and that this fact directly concerns our national security, can anyone tell me when Bulgaria was consulted within the framework of the prestigious "Partnership for Peace"? When were the other PFP member countries consulted? When and to what extent was heed taken of our standpoints? Unfortunately, the answer to this and other similar questions is abundantly clear. PFP membership not only does not put us in the position of being consulted, it does not even entitle us to any other information apart from what the international agencies supply. I ask myself, why are we then members? Perhaps it is so we can become accustomed to the idea that tomorrow we may be drawn into direct actions in this or another conflict without anyone asking us about it, but simply because our big partner—at one time his twin was called big brother—decided that something was to his advantage, and that we as his junior partner must carry it out. Have we not seen enough of where such behavior leads us?

As I said previously, it is still too early to say what will happen with the conflict in Bosnia as a result of the new U.S. and NATO policy. However, if the Bulgarian political elite has the ambition of conducting some kind of genuine national policy, it should immediately consider the issue of Bulgarian PFP membership. We do not need a facade of the kind that obliges us to passively and silently put up with a policy that is decided elsewhere by others, who do not even bother to keep us informed, let alone wanting to hear our views.

Only genuine and actively implemented neutrality can mobilize our nation's forces and give us a real chance of national survival and security. This is the message, if we are sensible enough to hear it, that comes from the latest development in NATO and U.S. policy regarding the Bosnian conflict.

Naturally, the lobbies of the great powers try to convince us that we are not capable, that it is not to our benefit, and that a policy of neutrality is impossible in general. The great powers have always opposed the neutrality of any small state, because any neutral state stands apart from their machinations and combinations and refuses to be their dumb pawn.

It stands to reason that a policy of active neutrality will require considerable efforts from contemporary Bulgaria. However, will not the membership of any military-political organizations also require expenditure and efforts from us? Then, after someone has made a frank investigation and asked the question, the population should decide itself whether to choose the path of neutrality. Or does it prefer the path of illusory alliances and such like, within which big brothers or big partners

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behave toward their smaller brethren with menacingly similar arrogance?

These are the facts. Bulgaria's PFP membership has been deprived of all meaning by the latest development in the U.S. and NATO policy regarding Bosnia. Will the government, National Assembly, and the president have the boldness and political courage to be the first to assume their responsibility?

Pirinski Returns From Visit to Bratislava

AU1909170095 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski returned from Bratislava with a promise that Slovakia is ready to support the Bulgarian bid for full membership of the organizations of the Central European countries.

Minister Pirinski emphasized how important it is to bring to a successful conclusion the talks on creating a free trade area with the Central European countries.

Videnov Describes Gas Supply Deals With Russia

AU1909123295 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0400 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At about midnight last night, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov returned from his one-day working visit to Moscow. He assessed the bilateral talks held in Moscow as timely and successful, and described the agreement to accelerate the transborder gas and petroleum energy projects and the forthcoming agreement on volumes, prices, and methods of payment for deliveries of natural gas following the expiry of the agreements currently in force were regarded as particularly beneficial.

On his arrival from Moscow, the Bulgarian Government leader made the following statement in response to journalists' questions.

[Begin Videnov recording] It is evident that we will be unable to reach agreement on paying for all the natural gas to be supplied to Bulgaria by barter deals, as this would involve immense amounts of goods that Bulgaria perhaps may not always be in a position to guarantee. However, we can evidently achieve an intergovernmental agreement on this issue before the end of the year. It will not be identical to the Yambol deal [deal for gas supplies via the Orenburg-Yambol pipeline], but it will be something similar, which will determine the amounts of gas guaranteed to be delivered to Bulgaria annually and the payment methods, which are of mutual interest. At this stage, the Russian side—both the Russian Government and Gazprom as the Russian gas supplier—showed interest in grain, meat, canned meat products, medicines, and construction and tourism services.

In the foreseeable future, Gazprom is evidently the monopoly gas supplier, but in Bulgaria several companies are engaged in these activities; in principle and in accordance with the agreement, it is possible to add the Bulgarian-Russian Topenergy Company to them. This would enable the two governments to provide substantial help, because they can attract investments and agree methods of payment, including through barter deals. [end recording]

Videnov Allegedly Concentrating Power in BSP

95P20984A Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 8-10 Aug 95

[Interview in three installments with Plamen Nikolov, former cabinet secretary for parliamentary affairs, by Valeriya Veleva; place and date not given: "Valeriya Veleva Converses With Former Parliamentary Secretary of the Council of Ministers Plamen Nikolov"]

[8 Aug pp 9-10]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Videnov Wanted To Exile Yanaki Stoilov From Bulgaria

Plamen Nikolov, 37, was born in Sofia. He studied data processing at the polytechnical school in Warsaw and philosophy at the Kliment Okhridski University in Sofia. During 1982-92, he worked at the Institute for Contemporary Social Theories (ICCT) which was subordinate to the Presidium of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. He began as a specialist in the "U.S. and NATO Section" and subsequently founded and directed the computer section at the institute. In November 1990, he defended his doctorate on U.S. foreign policy theories and concepts.

For more than 15 years, Nikolov was an interpreter for the unified state protocol office, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the Foreign Ministry. There were no high state or party figures for whom he did not interpret. He thinks that the dignity of the nation is damaged by the unjust treatment of the former chief of state Todor Zhivkov. Nikolov identifies himself not only as a convinced socialist, but also as a man with wide-open eyes for reality as it exists. His father was a high party and state functionary, diplomat, and publisher.

From 1992 until 1993, Plamen Nikolov worked at the Center for Strategic Research at the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), which was directed

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by Professor Aleksandur Lilov. After that, he founded a private business. On 1 March 1995, Nikolov was personally invited by Prime Minister Zhan Videnov to be a parliamentary secretary for the cabinet. Nikolov remained in this position until the end of May when he was unexpectedly relieved of his post "in the interests of the service" according to Article 328 of the Labor Code. On the day he received his last paycheck from the Council of Ministers (MS), Nikolov said, "I entered this government not as a Zhan Videnov man, but as a BSP man, and the first conflict to my knowledge erupted when I understood that they regarded me more as a courtier than as a colleague. If I had wanted to be a courtier, I would have been a monarchist, not a socialist." Nikolov is currently working as a consultant. Despite the unpleasantness and his own disappointment, he does not intend to leave the BSP, saying that he will continue to seek ways to participate in the renovation of ideas in the party.

[Veleva] Why did Zhan Videnov pick you to be the cabinet's parliamentary secretary, Mr. Nikolov?

[Nikolov] When I heard about the nomination, I asked the prime minister why he had selected me. He said that it was absolutely essential for the government to have a parliamentary secretary in order to maintain relations with the parliament and with the parliamentary group [PG] of the democratic left in the best way possible. He told me that Krasimir Premyanov had proposed his colleague Dinko Zhelev as the candidate. But Videnov judged that Dinko Zhelev was insufficiently known in party circles and could not exercise the level of authority required. They chose me because of my authority in the party, my wide acquintance outside the party, my ability to communicate with people, and so forth.

[Veleva] What kind of contractual arrangements did the two of you reach around the first of March this year?

[Nikolov] Despite my vascillation about accepting the job, Videnov convinced me of his urgent need for me in an absolutely unambiguous manner. We reached an agreement to begin work on 6 March.

Immediately after this part of the agreement, however, there were a series of demands from him that were confusing to me. According to his understanding, the PG should bring its work into conformity with the schedule of legislative work submitted solely by the government. This was not to be reached by force of argument, by convincing or dialogue, but through manipulation. Videnov said literally: "You must very quickly determine which brotherly groups are autonomous in the PG, how they interact, whether they have conflicts among themselves, and if so, on what basis. It is important to know whether it would be possible to exploit various brotherly groups or informal leaders to challenge when necessary the very leadership of the PG or of Krasimir Premyanov." It became obvious to me that he wanted the leadership of the PG to be under the control of the prime minister. And something else! Videnov gathered his thoughts, saying that it was rare to have the same orientation in the brotherly groups, the informal leaders in the Supreme Party Council, and in their interrelationship with the Executive Bureau, and in what way it would be possible to maintain a mutual balance of forces within the PG and the VS [Supreme Council] for the benefit of the opinions and decisions of prime minister. I understood that on many issues he had positions that had been worked out in advance and was not interested in discussing these same issues, but the technique by which decisions were made and were engineered by him personally.

[Veleva] In an interview with Radio Free Europe, you recalled Zhan Videnov's desire to be free of the presence of Yanaki Stoilov?

[Nikolov] In that first conversation, there was something symptomatic that made me so uneasy that I debated whether to immediately reject almost any involvement being considered. When the subject of the VS and the IB [Executive Bureau] came up, Zhan Videnov emphasized the sharp character of the disagreement between himself and Yanaki Stoilov during this period. Expressing himself in a rather ungentlemanly fashion, he asked me about the possiblities of using my contacts and ties abroad to promote as soon as possible the longterm specialization of Yanaki Stoilov in a study-abroad program to last at least a year. Quite nervously, Zhan Videnov said: "It must become clear to me, at any price during the next few weeks, whether he will leave, and I will be able to free myself of him. If he doesn't go, I shall have to figure out how to construct my dealings with him in the future to attain my goals in the IB and the VS." His statement was so cynical that he even permitted himself to add: "I am not interested in whether Yanaki Stoilov lands in a prestigious or a third-rate university or whether his specialized studies are successful or not. What I care about is that he gets a good stipend so that he stays abroad as long as possible."

[Veleva] Did you undertake this task?

[Nikolov] I did not do so, and this was the first stumbling block that upset our discussion. Subsequently, he did not bring up this topic since he obviously understood my aversion to operating in that way.

[Veleva] What danger did Zhan Videnov see for himself in the person of Yanaki Stoilov to make him want to remove Stoilov from the country?

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[Nikolov] From my own observations, I remain convinced that Zhan Videnov is trying to create a system of personal power which would be shared with many small people. He is trying to rid himself of all potential rivals for power, especially a rival who has a base to contest his power in the party. Zhan Videnov knows that the basis for all his power positions lies in his authority in the party. He knows that many doubts exist with respect to the manner he acquired power. It is widely known that without a strong patron Videnov would hardly have been able to assume these key duties confronting him, and for a certain period of time, he would hardly have been able to cope with them.

[Veleva] Was it only toward Yanaki Stoilov that such a attitude was directed?

[Nikolov] No. Videnov behaved in the same way toward anyone who disagreed with him. Even before my appointment, he asked me to intercede in smoothing over his conflicts with other members of the IB. They arose from the same basis—intolerance toward any kind of criticism of his conduct. When he asked me for my opinion on a given issue, he was not interested in my thoughts, but whether or not I would support the explication of his thesis. If I did support it, then he would try to promote—in a parallel fashion—his own conception and my collaboration in order to have someone with whom he could share responsibility. If my opinion differed from his, in the best case, he would keep quiet and not involve me in the particular issue in later discussions. This approach was characteristic of Zhan Videnov, and he applied it universally in selecting colleagues.

[Veleva] Is it possible for Videnov to employ other means to establish his "personal power," as you describe it?

[Nikolov] I have heard commentaries from colleagues from which I judge that he uses the special services for similar purposes. It is widely rumored that a good portion of the information which these services collect is submitted immediately to him without being forwarded in the proper hierarchical channels of the particular service. I cannot confirm whether these stories are credible or not.

[Veleva] On whom does Zhan Videnov rely? Who, do you think, are the people closest to him?

[Nikolov] I never became close to him despite the fact that, at first, he gave the impression that he would like to count me among his closest colleagues. Of the people with whom he often consulted and who had priority access to his office, Krasimir Nikolov, his chief of staff, is in first place. Lately, Mr. Nikolov has begun to screen the prime minister's contacts. Either he has received special authorization from the prime minister to usurp control over all administrative functions in the Council of Ministers, or he has delegated this plenipotentiary right to himself, and no one has challenged him. The prime minister's close advisers are Vladimir Zheglov, Ivan Angelov, Krasimir Raydovski, and only to a certain degree, the secretary of the Council of Ministers Valentin Korkinov.

[Veleva] Isn't this "screening" of contacts a normal prerogative of advisers?

[Nikolov] I would not say that his advisers in this instance are devils and he is a lamb. This assumption of alien rights by his advisers occurred with the knowledge of Zhan Videnov, with the right that he granted to them. The isolationism that is characteristic of the prime minister is a matter of his own conduct and his own choice.

[Veleva] The Zhan Videnov-Krasimir Nikolov connection—are there other dimensions, not just administrative ones?

[Nikolov] In the framework of his aspiration to establish an oligarchic group around himself, made up of people loyal to himself, who would build his personal system of power, the prime minister uses a very old and familiar device—social and political corruption. To his aides, he extends privileges and new, powerful jobs; his pretensions to secure control of the government over precise and crucial economic activities and sectors in the country are cleverly hidden. On how many boards and supervisory councils are there members from his own team, not those selected by the ministers? At the beginning of the administration, a tacit view was accepted for a sharp decrease in the number of different administrative councils since it was argued that the remuneration of the people in these bodies amounted to a large, double-digit sum. Now the prime minister ignored this policy: He appointed a few of his close associates to the "Neftokhim" company; Krasimir Nikolov and Valentin Korkinov are on the supervisory and administrative councils of certain banks, and so forth. His justification is that, in this way, he is trying to get decisive leverage for management by his own economic organizations. But these economic groups are the largest and most profitable in the country. It is precisely there that Zhan Videnov's true, personally loyal guard is ensconced.

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[9 Aug p 10]

The Prime Minister Refers to the Deputies: "This Scum in the Parliament"

[Veleva] Mr. Nikolov, why did Aleksandur Lilov let it be understood that he was distancing himself from Zhan Videnov?

[Nikolov] In so far as I know Lilov and [Andrey] Lukanov, I think that for the two of them such a style of behavior, the kind Zhan Videnov had already and definitively adopted and employed vis-a-vis them, would not be acceptable. Lilov and Lukanov are "dialogue" people who know how to find a point of departure for a dialogue even when the sharpest criticism is aimed at them. By the same token, they are not revengeful.

[Veleva] And how did the prime minister work with his ministers?

[Nikolov] Zhan Videnov devoted a lot of time to contacts with his advisers, but very little time to the ministers. Of course, the ministers visited him. But more than one or two of them expressed bitterness, in my presence, about the difficulty in gaining access to the prime minister, or about having to wait a long time to be admitted after he had given them an appointment. One morning I witnessed Academician Sendov [assembly chairman] waiting more than 45 minutes. From the beginning, it was characteristic of Videnov to be late and to have no regard for the time of those he kept waiting. He even frivolously cancelled meetings with visitors from foreign countries and visits by diplomats accredited to Bulgaria. The appraisal which I heard from a number of people, a view They shared nervously, is that Zhan Videnov does not work with his team of ministers, but with his own advisers.

[Veleva] You have said that he cancelled important meetings. Journalists who have observed him, however, indicate that Videnov is exceptionally hard working. He comes to work a little before seven in the morning and sometimes stays until eleven at night.

[Nikolov] I am not partial to the maxim: "He who works for nothing does not stand idle." A few crucial examples of the way in which the prime minister organizes his day should be noted. He does, indeed, come to work between 0730 and 0745 and stays late, not leaving until nine o'clock at night at the earliest. Obviously, he does not spare himself. But the real problem in this is that his schedule is not organized optimally. He begins his day by discussing the press and electronic media from the previous day with his colleagues from the press center. After that, without any breaks, his meetings start. There are people who visit him often, primarily the deputy ministers. I would not say that this creates a good atmosphere in their own ministries. But I won't give their names. And toward them, he applies the same work methods which he believed were applicable in my sphere. During these consecutive meetings, the prime minister does not even have time to mull over the previous discussion or to analyze problems systematically.

[Veleva] Surely his advisers perform that task?

[Nikolov] But he is the prime minister! With his advisers, Zhan Videnov would argue over the budget, as well as other vital issues, and the arguments often became vehement. Paradoxically, while he would thrash out the text of the draft budget law with his advisers in his office, he would communicate the data to the deputy prime minister or the appropriate minister by telephone. They were not in the office. The decision to increase the budget deficit by four billion leva to the benefit of the military and 1.5 billion for the Ministry of Internal Affairs was made over a quick cup of coffee in the morning, at great speed. Deadlines disturbed him. So, he said: "The budget must come up for the first reading in the plenary session before Great Friday [before Easter]. Even if they have to hang around all night in the plenary session, they will complete the work I want done!" When his advisers directed his attention to the fact that the VS might, in fact, show a desire to be informed about the draft budget, he retorted immediately that the VS had no basis for such pretentions. From the standpoint of the proclaimed division of authority that was correct, but his motive in this case was different. He said: "Now is not the proper time to have a dispute with the VS on this subject. And since the text of the draft law will not be ready until Friday, you should get a number from the parliamentary office so that the draft law would be brought up on Friday, but, in reality, we will be ready on Monday." And, in fact, the text of the draft budget law was xeroxed Monday around noon.

[Veleva] How did this disturbance in the parliamentary schedule end?

[Nikolov] I was there when he arranged things on the phone. Until now, I would not name names. I have been a witness to other violations of procedures that concern the second-most-important man in this oligarchical circle—Krasimir Premyanov, the chairman of the PG of the Democratic Left.

I have the prime minister's resolutions in which he writes that the answer to somebody or other's question, or even a deputy's question should be postponed until some date or other. And this is outside the provisions of the procedural rules of the National Assembly. I did not like to undertake such arrangements, figuratively speaking, to twist the arms of the opposition deputies to with-

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draw their questions. That job was done successfully by Krasimir Premyanov. If some deputy took the liberty of expressing a grievance about the delay in answering his question, the prime minister would answer arrogantly that it was not his problem, that it was due to poor management practices in the National Assembly. He did not accept criticism of himself in the matter. Actually, Videnov neglected parliamentary work and the PG and did not want to accept parliament as an institution that possessed, according to the constitution, superior power vis-a-vis the Council of Ministers.

[Veleva] It appears that Krasimir Premyanov is Zhan Videnov's champion in the parliamentary group?

[Nikolov] I think that the functioning of this system of personal power, which Zhan Videnov has established and which has been legitimized and is developing successfully, would not have been possible without this oligarchical tandem of Videnov-Premyanov. Krasimir Premyanov is the crucial figure in this system. He is the man who manages to exert his will over the parliamentary group on a day-to-day basis. Sometimes that involves blackmailing the deputies. In contrast to Videnov, the manner of operating used by Premyanov is flattering, I would say. He rarely resorts to those crude and cynical expressions that seem inate in the prime minister. But when the knife reaches the bone, Premyanov does not hesitate to threaten people with that notorious Article 11 of the internal rules of procedure. This article provides for the expulsion of deputies who have voted in a contrary fashion on especially important matters. And the people who determine "the importance" of votes are Videnov and Premyanov.

There was a delicate matter involving Krasimir Premyanov. During my conversation with the prime minister on the first of March, one of the things that perturbed me was the following: When he told me that the nomination of Dinko Zhelev, Premyanov's colleague, was not accepted, despite all the reasons Videnov pointed out, in practice, he did not want to have a second man of Krasimir Premyanov's in the Council of Ministers. Who was the first, I did not comprehend. Videnov emphasized that he wanted to have his own man in the PG. And then, he told me something in keeping with his cynical attitude toward Yanaki Stoilov. Word for word, Videnov said: "One way or another, facing me and becoming ever more sharp is the matter of changes in the parliamentary group and the removal of Krasimir Premyanov. But I cannot venture to undertake measures in this direction before Aleksandur Marinov is eliminated from the leadership in the parliamentary group." He stressed that, for him, it was more important to get rid of Aleksandur Marinov in order to prevent the dangerous place occupied by Krasimir Premyanov from being taken by Aleksandur Marinov. Everyone knows that Premyanov beat Aleksandur Marinov in the election [for parliamentary whip] by only one vote.

It is clear that Premyanov and Videnov are hostages for each other. But that doesn't bother me. Let them treat each other personally however they like, obviously in accordance with their morals. What does worry me is that their hostages are the party, the parliamentary group, and the country's policy of democratization. Their hostage is not only the last reserve of trust, but also the last reserve of hope that the Bulgarian electorate has given the BSP and the entire stratum of political elite in the past five years. I want to stress that I would prefer that my appraisal not be justified and that everything I say be ascribed to me as an adventurer on my gravestone.

[Veleva] Could discontent with the "strong measures" used by the prime minister in his relations with the PG of the Left lead to a breach in the majority in the National Assembly and further to a change in the parliamentary sphere?

[Nikolov] Unfortunately, yes. I have been a witness to terrible retorts from the prime minister directed at the deputies from the PG of the Democratic Left. More than once he has called them "scum" or said, "Take steps with the rubbish in the parliament so that matters get resolved." Another one of his sayings, used more than once, was: "If necessary, twist their arms, break their heads, but they should vote the way I have said and in the time period I have set!" I accept responsibility personally for quoting these phrases used by the prime minister.

One of my apprehensions boils down to the hypothesis that this strong approach could destabilize the parliamentary majority, and consequently destabilize the entire administration established in Bulgaria after the elections. Such a destabilization would be calamitous for the country at this time.

[Veleva] Did the prime minister permit a conflict with the Constitutional Court [KS] with respect to the amendments to the Law on Land?

[Nikolov] In the PG, there were serious criticisms of the draft amendments to the Law on Land. They pointed out the danger that the texts were so imprecise that the KS might reject them. The prime minister was privy to these discussions, but I think, that he consciously underestimated them. The rejection of the law was welcome to him because it allowed him to transfer the responsibility for stopping the agricultural reform to the KS. As the old saying goes, to shift responsibility from the sick to the healthy head. One of

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the most characteristic traits of Videnov is his striving to distribute the responsibility that his position demands. The prime minister always hunts for ways to devolve responsibility to other institutions in order to protect himself from a possible failure.

[10 Aug p 10]

The Leader of the BSP Is Disposed To Lose the Elections in Sofia in Order To Get Rid of Aleksandur Marinov

[Veleva] Ten days ago, at the BSP's national conference, reproaches were heard that many of the talented cadres of the party are outside the party's attention. Is that true, Mr. Nikolov?

[Nikolov] This, again, touches upon Videnov's dislike for having people who are not personally loyal to him placed in the state's administration. When Zhan Videnov headed the VS of the BSP, he was a general without an army. Under his personal direction was the work of thousands, and it is immoral for this now to be overlooked. For the dismissal of the BSP members who were critical of his leadership, he resorted to using the notorious "Kapudaliev" article minus the explanation "in the interest of the work." This article was often used in accordance with internal political or interparty reasons for retribution toward the inconvenient.

[Veleva] In BSP circles, there are comments that the BSP is prepared to lose the local elections in Sofia so that Videnov can obtain the resignation of Aleksandur Marinov, the leader of the Sofia party organization. Is that true?

[Nikolov] In my opinion, yes. This thesis has been circulating for a long time. Zhan Videnov tried to discuss it with me. He made efforts to suggest suitable new candidates in the TsIK [Central Electoral Commission] who would allow the kind of procedural proposals for organizing the elections to slip past their purview so that they would permit a certain loss in Sofia to occur. I know that it sounds very cynical, but what can I do! When Zhan Videnov is fighting to strengthen his monopoly on power, he is unscrupulous. He has no qualms about the fact that the BSP might lose the elections in Sofia; what is important for him is to calumniate his opponent Aleksandur Marinov! To discredit him and remove him from the Sofia organization and from the parliamentary group.

[Veleva] Is it only their ambitions for power that set Videnov and Marinov against each other?

[Nikolov] It's far from just that. I would not even say that their ambitions for power put them at odds. Ambition for power is the case with Zhan Videnov, but it is not harmonious with the ideas and ideological orientation that the BSP professes. He is trying to do everything possible to interpret the latest BSP national conference as an alibi for his policy. But the truth is that there were far too many critical statements about the conduct of government policy. Once again, I want to emphasize that responsibility for this policy belongs to the prime minister and not the government as a whole regardless of whether this responsibility might subsequently be shifted to the debit side of the BSP's ledger.

[Veleva] In the press, assertions have appeared to the effect that the conference was well orchestrated. Your observations?

[Nikolov] The conference was completely and unctiously staged. None of the critical notes that rang in a series of statements became the topic for a thorough discussion. Even toward the middle of the second day, a delegate stood up and called out: "Comrades, finish up the business a little more quickly, we need to rest. Tomorrow, we're going to Buzludzha; our holiday is coming!" This speculation is especially ominous. It is not usual to manipulate the emotional state of the delegates in such an ugly way. So, preconditions were created so that conclusions from the conference should not be made by the delegates, but again by the leaders, and in the way most propitious for themselves. But the conference proceeded in silence and with the prime minister's claims that the party is now obliged to support him? This, actually, is much more alarming. Such a production is entirely incorrect. The party owes nothing to anyone unless he carries out his work well. If there are disputes in the party, if there is criticism in the party, if dissatisfaction is ripening, the party is obliged to express them. The party is bound to preserve its authority in society and to be the corrective for the administration, not a clapping audience.

[Veleva] In what direction would Zhan Videnov like to turn the party, do you think?

[Nikolov] One of the sharp criticisms made at the conference was that the ideological life in the party has faded. This situation is convenient for Zhan Videnov because he can interpret this dying ideological life in the party and the transitional effects until he arrives at the point which suits him. Right now, he is trying to counteract any kind of attempt to advance ideological development and renovation within the BSP. With the exception of the center which is directed by Georgi Purvanov, ideological work is not being conducted in the party.

I would also like to say something else. To me, it is symptomatic that Zhan Videnov is trying to combine

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the party's power with that of the state. Remember that when Lilov was chairman of the VS of the BSP, the prime minister was Lukanov. There were many criticisms directed at the two of them because they were unable to agree with each other, but obviously they understood the basic fact: there would be no coincidence between the party's and the state's power. If you recall, this was also a basic criticism made by the BSP of Filip Dimitrov at the time of his administration.

[Veleva] But in the BSP's statute, there is the thesis that the party leader should become the prime minister!

[Nikolov] I believe that it is pernicious for the party leader to also be the prime minister. The party should preserve its autonomy as a matter of principle. A long time ago, there was a discussion among international political scientists about this problem. In this discussion, the fundamental instances are the following: one party, in order not to be the cover for undemocratic administrative methods, should retain control over the managerial body detached from the party when the party becomes the administration. The only way for this [to occur] is not to have a correspondence in positions. I do not think that it is proper at the end of the 1990's for us to return to the situation in which Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin spoke for himself using the third person singular.

[Veleva] It seems that President Zhelev was right when, in his appeal in parliament last month, he declared that he saw attempts to merge the party with the state?

[Nikolov] For me, it is extremely unpleasant to admit that my words currently coincide with the thoughts of President Zhelev. Unfortunately, I treated him with contempt, and that is why, with even more regret, I confirm his reasoning. I do not believe that his motives are sincere, but somehow or other, Zhelev has every prerequisite for saying what he did. But, I stress that responsibility in this case is borne by Zhan Videnov, and not the government or the BSP as a whole.

[Veleva] Is it possible to muster the forces to remove Videnov from his party powerbase three years before the BSP's congress and before the BSP's election forum?

[Nikolov] I hope that the BSP has, at long last, ceased to be so inert as to wait another three years. I hope that the BSP will not allow such a disastrous development for the advancement of the party and of democratization in Bulgaria. Currently, the further development of the democratizing processes in Bulgaria is, in the final analysis, linked to the activities and administration of the BSP. If the BSP is a strong party, it will find a way much earlier to force the conduct of its own prime minister to adhere to other limitations and boundaries as it regulates authority and its use of power. The most rapid and urgent change which is completely possible is an alteration in the leadership of the PG even before December this year.

[Veleva] What did you want to say at the conference, and why did you decide now to begin to speak about these things?

[Nikolov] I wanted to talk about what the prime minister tried to persuade me to do with respect to Yanaki Stoilov, as well as to give an overall appraisal concerning his style and methods of work. The refusal I received was accompanied by an awful lot of pronouncements. If my arguments were invalid, what would be the problem in having the conference spend two or three minutes refuting them? On my own accord, before my dismissal and the press conference that followed it, I accepted a gentleman's agreement that I would remain silent until the conference about my doubts and fears, in the hope that I would have an occasion to share them with the delegates. Now, since I was not afforded that opportunity, I no longer have reason not to feel free to publicize my apprehensions. Moreover, I shall fully undertake to prepare a written memorandum for the discussion that will be held in the VS and to inform the VS, the PG, the chairman of the parliament, and all authorities about what I am now saying.

[Veleva] Mr. Nikolov, is there anything else that especially surprised you about Zhan Videnov?

[Nikolov] It's difficult for me to say. But what constantly perturbed me about him was the following: At the beginning of March, he asked me whether I would be able to tell him who were the Masons in the PG of the Democratic Left. When I said that I had no information on that matter, he cited particular individuals who, he asserted, were Masons. I will not mention their names so that it doesn't strike the readers as a very bad joke. To my undisguised surprise, he responded: "No, no, you underestimate this issue; pay attention and find a way to inform me in the next few days!"

[Veleva] Does the prime minister's wife have influence on his governmental actions?

[Nikolov] Won't I get into the juicy details? It is alleged that soon after Videnova began to enter into new areas of her education, a circle of many new acquaintences formed around her. Through her, these new acquaintences wended their way to the prime minister who approached them uncritically. I have no insight as to whether these allegations are trustworthy or not. I do have a view on something else: when the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin arrived, it was raining, if you remember. Around 11 o'clock, Chernomyrdin was welcomed at the airport; about 1230

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I became the witness to a strange telephone conversation at the Council of Ministers. Someone called and gave urgent instructions to invite hairdressers to the prime minister's office at 1330 since his hairdo had been ruined by the rain. Videnov would have gone from Boyana to the MS to fix his hair since it would not be convenient to do it at Boyana. I was very surprised, especially since I had in mind how little time and attention he had devoted to preparations for this visit during the preceeding days, and just when the visit was underway, he found half an hour for his hair. Whether this is a question of his wife's influence or that of the hairdresser, I cannot say, but certainly, Videnov is the first man who has paid so much attention to his hair.

[Veleva] Aren't you uneasy about your future after these revelations to TRUD?

[Nikolov] A few days ago, I went to the MS to get my last paycheck, and some people were prophesying. I was very surprised when colleagues shared their alarm with me concerning my interview last week with Radio Free Europe—that "serious problems" were imminent in connection with the publicity given my appraisals. Clearly, the aim was to intimidate me. Such attempts were made a month and a half ago, a little before the press conference following my dismissal. Even if Zhan Videnov or Krasimir Premyanov were not behind these efforts, they testify to the mentality which is present in their circle—for retribution against a man who presumes to express his opinions publically. And this is already alarming.

[Veleva] And with these confessions you are not serving anybody's interest, Mr. Nikolov?

[Nikolov] Yes, I am serving interests. These are the interests of democratizing the BSP and of a free ideological and organizational life inside the BSP. I think that I serve the interests of the emancipation, through information, of Bulgarian society. And I shall continue to serve these interests. Of course, I would not like to exhaust my criticism in advance. But this is an ancient problem: whether or not to say, "The emperor has no clothes!"

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Uhde Briefs Journalists on Perry Talks, NATO

LD2009093595 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0900 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry today assured Czech deputies of the continuing joint responsibility of the United States for European security. This is what Chamber of Deputies Chairman Milan Uhde told journalists after Perry's meeting with deputies. Perry also gave assurances that the North Atlantic Alliance feels jointly responsible for the security situation in Europe and that NATO enlargement is on the agenda but that the pace of the enlargement, naturally, depends on individual applicants for membership managing to meet the criteria.

Klaus on Coalition, Currency Convertibility

LD1909193995 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1615 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Weekly interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Lucie Weissova; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Weissova] Prime Minister, let us start the interview with the coalition. On 14 September, the representatives of four coalition parties decided what they could do before the election and what they could not do. So it looks like the government's policy statement, what you said you would do when you won the election, will not be fulfilled 100 percent. Do you understand it as a failure to keep a promise, or is the fact that so much has been fulfilled a success?

[Klaus] The government manifesto, which has dozens of pages and which is created in the first weeks when chaos reigns, is simply a document that forms the basic outline for our actions, that considers basic values on which we can build, that conveys the basic information to parliament and the citizens. In this respect I absolutely believe that the manifesto of this ruling coalition and this government has been fulfilled.

Some perceive the government manifesto as a definite and final list of items to be ticked off, as it were. I think that it cannot be seen in these terms, and using it to whip the government with it is absolutely unfair.

[Weissova] The coalition partners agreed that one of the pledges that will be fulfilled before the election is the creation of a senate. What do you say to that? You have never been keen on a senate.

[Klaus] I do not know what to say about this. I have really never been keen on a senate. I am not keen on it now, but it is one of the things about which a consensus with the intergovernmental coalition exists, so there is a certain likelihood that a senate will be introduced in our country.

[Weissova] You did not take part in the Thursday session yourself, but I am sure you have been informed about it by Mr. Zieleniec and Mr. Lux. What did you talk about with the head of the KDU-CSL [Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party]?

[Klaus] How do you know I talked with the head of the KDU-CSL?

[Weissova] Nova TV had the news and then CTK.

[Klaus] Naturally, after the talks of the coalition four, I was in bed drinking tea, and I spent about five or six hours constantly on the telephone and was told how the coalition meeting proceeded. Naturally, I know these meetings and I know their atmosphere and that is why I am convinced that what happened there was nothing extraordinary. It was a standard dialogue in which there was some agreement and some disagreement. I am sure the news conference that followed more or less reflected the feelings and sentiments of the participants in these talks. I do not think it is good to change one's mind, to decide that the result was a bit worse for me than I would have wished and to start issuing strong statements. I do not do this, I have never done it, and that is why I do not intend to react to strong statements by even stronger statements after another two days. [passage omitted] It would be very easy for me to nudge coalition partners. Please note that I never do that.

[Weissova] One of the government pledges that will be fulfilled is passing a new foreign currency law that means full convertibility of the koruna and that paves the way to the OECD, which is among the most advanced states of the world. Milan Uhde has said that it is symbolic that this is happening five years from the day the Federal Assembly adopted the government scenario of the economic reform. Could it be said that our transformation process lasted five years and that we are the first postcommunist country to reach the goal?

[Klaus] I do not want to be driven to uttering sentences about what we have achieved first among all of the countries. This should be left to individual judgment; everybody should listen to assessments that exist in the world. But that is not the main thing. The main thing is how we judge ourselves. I noticed a headline in a paper today that, in my view, captures the point. It speaks to the point because today it almost seems to us that passing the new foreign currency law and starting a new stage in the convertibility of our currency is almost normal. Our coalition partners do not even want to talk about it because they take it for granted. I think the

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headline in the newspaper today grasps it much more exactly.

The dream has come true. The idea that our koruna could be convertible and could be exchanged everywhere in Paris, New York, Frankfurt, and Vienna was a thing the overwhelming majority of the people of this country could hardly imagine. And the fact that nowadays we are so rapidly approaching this stage is considered commonplace. What is commonplace may be regarded as commonplace, I think, but let us appreciate the enormous chunk of work that lies behind it.

[Weissova] Apart from the commonplace pluses brought about by the convertibility, there can be minuses. We will cease to be a protected economy, we will be exposed to hard financial capital and business competition. Need we be afraid of it?

[Klaus] Naturally, there are two sides to everything. Something is gained, something is complicated and lost. Currency convertibility, to a certain extent, exposes the economy to the world, to the outside world, and, naturally, when it is exposed, the wind may blow from time to time in a direction we do not wish. This is a fact, naturally. That is why we hesitated for a long time about the timing of when we should introduce convertibility. That is why I have long rejected cursory glances at this matter, which meant: Let us do it at once. But I think now is the time it should be done.

[Weissova] Thank you for the interview.

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Government Calls For President's Resignation

LD1909184295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] While our [1630 GMT] news bulletin was on air, we received a fax with the Slovak Government statement. Here is the full text:

Slovak President Michal Kovac is continuing his attempts to paralyze the constitutional system. The Slovak Government resolutely denounces the tabloid-style practices, the double meanings, and the direct hints made by the president. Even within an ordinary civil law case about the protection of personal integrity, these accusations, which are directed at both the ministers and the Slovak Government as a whole, would be judged as severe enough to break the law on this matter, independently of the fact that this behavior is, in this case, carried out by the first citizen of the country, who holds the post of president, and acts in this way toward one of the three components of state power.

For these and other reasons, the Slovak Government invited the president to a meeting today. The president, alas, refused the invitation.

The Slovak Government has so far behaved in a reserved fashion. It has been concerned with its work and avoided any vain disputes. However, the pressure to reverse the democratically chosen political system makes the government concerned about the threats to the country. Before the president's acts prove to be betraying our common country, which, after centuries of existence under foreign rule, was eventually able to apply the right for self-determination, the Slovak Government calls on Mr. Michal Kovac to consider his future position as the Slovak president and resign.

After the escalation of the unsubstantiated attacks at the present government coalition, after his failures, which earned him the Slovak parliament's denouncement, the Slovak Government has to denounce with all of its firmness the president's inability to carry out both domestic and foreign politics. In conformity with the loss of the rest of confidence in the president, the Slovak Government has to declare that any future cooperation between the government and the president is impossible.

This declaration is even more difficult because Mr. Michal Kovac, knowingly or not, severely impaired the prestige of the head of state as a symbol of the Slovak Republic and continues to be a destabilizing element in the strengthening Slovak statehood.

Slovak citizens! The Slovak Government did not decide with ease to call on Michal Kovac to resign from the post of Slovak president. However, any other solution would bring hard consequences for our young and promising country. No power struggle, no unsatisfied political ambitions, but honest and hard work and a fast implementation of new life practices, seeking application at the new labor market, as well as healthy national self-confidence, are the starting points in our complicated but manageable situation.

Spokesman Explains Kovac Refusal To Attend Meeting

LD1909124895 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Slovak President Michal Kovac was invited yesterday by a special letter to attend the Cabinet meeting held today in connection with the interview Kovac granted to the editorial office of the daily NARODNA OBRODA.

The president asked the government only yesterday to provide more information about topics that were to be discussed. It was literally several minutes ago that my colleague Michal Tvarozek telephoned Vladimir Stefko, the presidential spokesman, to ask him whether the government's answer to this request had been received.

[Begin recording] [Stefko] Yes, a letter from the prime minister, an addendum, so to speak, to his letter yesterday, which asked the president to attend a closed Cabinet session at 1600 hours today, was delivered by the Government Office at about 1045 today.

The letter says that the only point on the agenda of this closed session should be a frank discussion about the president's statements aimed against the government and the government coalition.

[Tvarozek] Did the letter contain any other information?

[Stefko] No, there is no more information. The president rejects the idea that he made a statement targeted against the government and the government coalition because he has nothing to say against the government and the government coalition. The views he holds regarding some problems of our political and economic life are simply different. But the president at the same time welcomes the Slovak Government's resolve to very quickly resume communication with the president, which has come to a halt and which can be described as ignorance, an ignorance of the president as the head of the Slovak Republic. In the foreseeable future, the president will invite the prime minister and his Cabinet colleagues to a thorough discussion concerning all problems—in particular, the problems of importance of our social reality.

[Tvarozek] Does this mean that the president has accepted the invitation?

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[Stefko] The president will not attend the Cabinet session today. What he wants is that a meeting of this kind, if it is to go ahead, should be thoroughly prepared by both sides following an agreement between the two sides. What he also wants is to hold this meeting in his office.

[Tvarozek] Does this mean that the president wants to expand the agenda of the talks?

[Stefko] He feels that one or two sentences that worried some members of the Slovak Cabinet do not represent a problem of real importance or Slovakia's most important problem. He feels that there are a whole number of other problems. These include not only the government's attitude toward the president and his office, but also a whole number of other matters concerning legislative issues, economic management, privatization, and so on.

The president reiterated that he welcomed this offer but that the agenda of the discussion should be broader and that it will have to be prepared.

[Tvarozek] Is it not possible to describe the president's attitude by saying that the president has no arguments to support his recommendations addressed to the SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA editorial office?

[Stefko] The president did not comment on this issue. It was not an accusation leveled at the government. It was evidently only his response to some articles and claims that were denied by Swiss, Austrian, and Luxembourg banks in SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA. His (?two sentences) in the interview for NARODNA OBRODA were targeted at the SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA daily.

[Tvarozek] Has the date of the next meeting been considered?

[Stefko] No, factual reasons have made this simply impossible because, at the time of our holding this telephone conversation, the prime minister's letter has been in the Presidential Office only just over half an hour. [end recording]

Carnogursky on SIS Role in Kovac Jr. Kidnapping

AU1909123795 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 13 Sep 95 p 13

[Report on interview given by KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky to an unidentified PRACA correspondent; place and date not given: "Many Indications Suggest Participation by the Slovak Information Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Jan Carnogursky, deputy in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] for the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], intends to ask the NRSR Defense and Security Affairs Committee, of which he is a member, to question at an in camera meeting Major Simunic, former investigator of the case of the kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr. "His statements indicate that the Slovak Information Service [SIS] was involved in the kidnapping. This circumstance is so grievous that it is necessary to deal with it," Jan Carnogursky said in an interview for PRACA No. 211.

[PRACA] What progress have you made in your own investigation of the kidnapping? Have you managed to discover any new facts or circumstances?

[Carnogursky] Two circumstances are highly probable, almost certain. One of them is that a Mercedes microbus that with great probability belongs to SIS was in front of Michal Kovac Jr.'s house at Svaty Jur two or three days before the kidnapping. It is necessary to verify whether it really was an SIS vehicle and why it was there. The second circumstance that is highly probable and virtually certain is that, on the day of the kidnapping—that is, on 31 August—SIS member Milan Lovich spent several hours at the Bratislava-Petrzalka border crossing. It is necessary to find out what he was doing there.

[PRACA] Do you think your proposal will be adopted, given the political composition of the Defense and Security Affairs Committee?

[Carnogursky] I doubt it. Should the proposal be turned down, however, this will again reinforce the suspicion that the government had a hand in the kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 14 September on page 2 carries a 200-word report by "sm" on an "extraordinary meeting" of the parliamentary Defense and Security Affairs Committee in Bratislava on 13 September. The report mentions that the "coalition majority on the committee rejected Jan Carnogursky's proposal that, at the next committee meeting, deputies receive from the previous and present investigators and the president of the Slovak Republic Police Corps information on the investigation of the kidnapping."]

Foreign Minister Departs for Belarus

LD1909191295 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1630 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk left for his first official visit to Belarus.

The itinerary of his two-day visit includes meetings with top Belarus officials. Among other things, Schenk wants to discuss the signing of an agreement on visa-free travel between Slovakia and Belarus.

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Defense Minister Leaves for Talks in Turkey

LD1909211395 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Slovak Defense Minister Jan Sitek left for a four-day visit to Turkey. Sitek will attend the opening of the international exhibition of army technology and civilian aircraft IDEF '95.

During the visit, Sitek will hold talks with his Turkish counterpart, Mehmet Golhan. The ministers are expected to sign a memorandum on military cooperation.

EBRD Official Views Failed Mochovce Talks

AU1909201095 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 16 Sep 95 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Jiri Huebner, director of the EBRD Department for the Czech and Slovak Republics, by Eva Laukova; place and date not given: "Where Does the Limit of Safety End?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Slovak Government has approved a project according to which acceptable terms concerning the provision and use of credits to finance the completion of the Mochovce nuclear power plant have been offered by the Russian Federation and the Prague-based Ceska Sporitelna [Czech Savings Bank] and Komercni Banka [Commercial Bank]. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] has found itself among those whose credit terms were deemed unacceptable. Jiri Huebner, director of the EBRD Department for the Czech and Slovak Republics, with seat in London, commented on this in an interview for PRAVDA.

[Laukova] When did you learn that the Slovak side does not consider taking out a credit from your bank?

[Huebner] Active negotiations ended in March of this year. We were prepared to propose the whole transaction to the EBRD Board of Directors for approval, but, a few days before the London meeting of the Board of Directors, the Slovak side requested in a letter that the negotiations be halted. Had it not been for this letter, the Board of Directors would have approved the credit.

[Laukova] And there have not been any meetings since then?

[Huebner] On 12 July I had talks with your government commissioner, Marian Sip, in Bratislava. The Slovak side wanted the EBRD to assume a stand on the new Slovak proposal concerning the Mochovce project, in which Skoda Prague and Skoda Plzen, as general supplier, would play a bigger role than the French firm Electricite de France [EdF]. My reply was negative in the sense that we are not ready to support this.

[Laukova] What were your reasons?

[Huebner] We set out six conditions for cooperation. We wanted to support a project that would be the cheapest for Slovakia, also from the nonnuclear viewpoint. Furthermore, we wanted two units of the Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear power plant to be closed no later than by the year 2000 and all the recommendations of independent advisers concerning the safety of this nuclear power plant to be implemented. For Slovakia to be able to pay off the credit, we wanted electricity prices to be raised. We wanted Slovakia to ratify the Vienna Nuclear Safety Convention, and the last condition was the management of the project by renowned firms with experience from the management of nuclear power plants, such as the EdF. The new alternative proposed to us by the Slovak side did not meet all of these conditions.

[Laukova] Public pressure regarding the safety issue apparently plays an important role in this context....

[Huebner] Exactly. This concerns, above all, public opinion in Western Europe. We were ready to give our support to a project guaranteeing maximum safety, in which the question of costs would be secondary. Participation by the EdF was inevitable, in our opinion. The Slovak side defined only the acceptable level of safety, without a leading role for the EdF, which would also help to cut costs.

[Laukova] What did the EdF offer?

[Huebner] This French firm, which we wanted to support, was ready to guarantee the maximum costs and the deadline for the project's completion. The costs were admittedly demanding, but they guaranteed the maximum safety that present-day technology offers (in contrast to the nonguaranteed costs estimated by the Skoda companies, the general supplier of the Temelin nuclear power plant, which will not be completed by the planned deadline and within budgeted costs). This successful firm operates 89 nuclear power plants that it has itself built. It commands immense experience and trust. Moreover, it is sufficiently strong financially to meet its commitments. Skoda Prague and Skoda Plzen are not able to give a similar guarantee, in our opinion.

[Laukova] Were you unable to make a compromise decision that would be acceptable to both sides?

[Huebner] We are an international financial institution. We have 54 shareholders, including all EU member countries. [passage omitted] We could not afford a compromise. The degree to which one is willing to pay for safety and where the limit of safety ends is, in part, a subjective issue. Slovakia wants to join the EU. Therefore, it was not wise to reject the EdF as the most experienced operator. Slovakia apparently is not

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fully aware of the strength of people's trust in safety in the West.

[Laukova] Tell us more about your offer.

[Huebner] I want to stress that, from the viewpoint of the credit life of 18 years and the terms of payment, our offer was very attractive financially, substantially more attractive than the offer of Komercni Banka and Ceska Sporitelna for the other alternative. A great deal concerning the Czech-Russian alternative remains unclear regarding the partners who will join it.

[Laukova] According to the approved government project, Russia is to provide an $80-million credit, but, at the same time, it wants Slovakia to undertake to receive Russian nuclear fuel as long as nuclear power stations operate in Slovakia, without specifying the terms of the contract....

[Huebner] This has its disadvantages. Slovakia wants to have nuclear power plants as a source of energy. This gives it greater independence because Slovakia gets all of its gas and crude oil from Russia. You could purchase the fuel, uranium, anywhere. However, if you meet Russia's condition concerning the purchase of fuel, your dependence on Russian energy sources will be total. This should not be too welcome an option from the viewpoint of the country's sovereignty.

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Serbs Laying Mines Close to Border

LD2009100795 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbs have started to lay additional mines in close proximity to the Hungarian border, across from the Hungarian town of Dravaszabolcs. Border Guard Spokesman Attila Krisan said that the Serbs have laid antipersonnel mines along a 30-meter stretch of the Hungarian border, only 4 meters from the border.

The spokesman warned the population to take extra care when moving around in the border region.

Parliament Approves Air Defense Modernization Plan

LD1909195295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We continue our program with a parliamentary report. Andras Kerekes and Tamas Luigits report. The parliamentary resolution on the air defense system's modernization plan has been approved with no votes against.

[First correspondent] The modernization of the Hungarian air defense system is an urgent task; delay might damage the sovereignty of the Hungarian air space, Defense Minister Gyoergy Keleti said when submitting two parliamentary draft resolutions on the preservation of the defense capability of the low altitude air defense system and on the development of the radio location reconnaissance, information, and control system. The expected life of certain technical equipment will expire in the near future; therefore, their replacement has to start as soon as possible, and they will have to be replaced by modern equipment.

[Second correspondent] The National Assembly has approved, with no votes against, the plan that in accordance with the country's financial situation, the Ministry of Defense will, through international tenders, buy modern short range air defense missile systems and other equipment which will be able to guarantee the security of the Hungarian air space. The modernization will be overseen by the National Assembly's Defense Committee.

[First correspondent] On behalf of the Defense Committee, Sandor Szivi, deputy of the Hungarian Socialist Party said that the committee had unanimously supported the proposal, because the modernization of the outdated air defense, missile and radio location system was a vital condition for the preservation of the country's defense capability and the prevention of further air accidents, which were becoming more and more frequent.

[Second correspondent] This morning the debate of the insurance bill also started. According to Laszlo Akar, political state secretary at the Ministry of Finance, who submitted the bill, one of the most important aims of the bill is the legal regulation of the rights of those who take out an insurance policy and the financial and legal protection of the contracting parties.

Keynote speakers from both government coalition parties opposed a possible merger of insurance and banking supervision. A speaker from the Hungarian Democratic Forum objected to the possibility that the bill would restrict the scope of insurance companies, because it could intervene in their business any time.

Activity, Prospects of Paks Nuclear Power Station

AU2009072895 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG (supplement) in Hungarian 16 Sep 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Jozsef Szabo, general director of the Nuclear Power Station in Paks, by Istvan Palugyai; place and date not given: "An Unstylish Institution on the Top List"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Szabo] Although the Nuclear Power Station in Paks produces electric energy for a third of the price of electricity produced by conventional power stations, the Hungarian Power Plants Trust [MVM] charges uniform prices for a given service, so our profit is used to support the activity of more expensive units. Likewise, the regulations according to which we are obliged to purchase the uranium concentrate from Pecs at a set price of $100 a kilogram also harms our efficiency. This uranium concentrate must provide half of our fuel supplies up to the end of 1997. We can only purchase the rest of our fuel from the Russians, who only ask $29 for the same amount.

[Palugyai] This situation will probably change soon, because the upcoming privatization of the Hungarian energy industry will not leave the Paks Nuclear Power Station uneffected either.

[Szabo] According to the version currently in force, while individual power stations can be sold even at 100 percent, Paks has been left out of this package. A holding made up of three stock corporations will remain state property by a percentage of 50 plus 1. With the exception of the 0.1 percent belonging to the Paks local government, the Nuclear Power Station will become the property of the MVM, something that seems to be an adequate solution for us.

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[Palugyai] Will this also satisfy a future buyer? Apparently, a British firm has already declared that they were interested in the purchasing the MVM, but not together with the shares of the Paks Nuclear Power Station.

[Szabo] It is also natural that the buyer wants to know what he gets; it also makes a difference to us who the buyer is: one whose power supply system includes a considerable number of nuclear power stations, or one who does not have such experience. [passage omitted]

[Palugyai] One of the major quality factors of nuclear power stations is connected to the international seven-point scale of operation troubles. Naturally, the fewer such nuclear events take place in a reactor, the safer the reactor in question is. Where does Paks stand in this respect?

[Szabo] This scale was introduced in 1990, and Hungary accepted it in 1991. We did not have any operational breakdowns in 1992; we had two first-degree events in 1993, and three first-degree events in 1994, an outstanding achievement even by international standards. An analysis carried out in 1994 also showed that human error caused 25-28 percent of these events; the rest was caused by technical problems. In accordance with international practice, most problems happened at idle blocks. Therefore, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], we set up a study center and we intend to introduce a new training method for reactor maintenance personnel.

[Palugyai] How much do you spend on safety?

[Szabo] We spent 850-900 million forints [Ft] on safety in 1994, and this year we intend to spend Ft1.1 billion, which is one-quarter of our annual development expenses. In harmony with the international controls and the IAEA safety increasing project, the safety level at the Paks Nuclear Power Station is adequate. However, in order to continue to maintain this level, we must take further steps in some areas. A project aimed at increasing safety for reactors and their immediate vicinity is currently under preparation. In the framework of this project, we will modernize our control engineering.

[Palugyai] In connection with the Yugoslav conflict, have you discussed the extent to which the Nuclear Station can be defended against a possible terrorist attack?

[Szabo] We cannot do anything against missiles, combat aircraft, and bombs. This is the task of our Air Force. Naturally, the airspace around the Nuclear Power Station in Paks is closed, but the border is not too far. However, although a nuclear explosion cannot happen, such an action is regarded as a nuclear attack, and we must take identical action against the attacker. Of course, we are talking about a case that is unimaginable with a sober mind. However, an economic crime is much more imaginable, because the attackers do not have to reach the station for this; it is sufficient to cut the long-distance power lines a few kilometers from the station, and this forces us to halt. It is true, however, that we have adequate defense against such events. [passage omitted]

[Palugyai] It is possible that we might have to decide on the construction of a new power station. Will you favor a nuclear power station?

[Szabo] We have trust in nuclear power stations, even if the almost exaggerated safety systems make the present nuclear stations increasingly complicated. The development projects in the United States and West Europe are working on building reactors that can be operated more simply. However, we cannot expect the emergence of new types of reactors before the year 2005. [passage omitted]

MIEP Campaigns Against Energy Privatization

LD1509161195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 15 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] has collected 70,000 signatures in protest against the the privatization of the energy, gas, and oil industry.

Party chairman Istvan Csurka announced at a press briefing that they will hand in the signatures to Maria Korody, deputy speaker of the National Assembly on Monday. In accordance with the law, if 50,000 signatures are collected regarding an issue, parliament is obliged to put the issue on its agenda for debate, the MIEP chairman recalled.

Demonstrators Protest Romanian Education Law

AU1909074195 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 Sep 95 p 3

[Correspondent's report: "Budapest Demonstration Against the Romanian Education Law"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Official politics in Romania throw linguistic nuclear bombs at the ethnic minorities living in this country. The Romanian-Hungarian rapprochement should first be created in Romania. Instead, surpassing the late Ceausescu, the Romanian leadership takes new restrictive measures against the national minorities—Matyas Szuros declared at the rally of the Bocska Alliance held in the Heroes' Square in Budapest condemning the new Romanian language law directed against the ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania. After the meeting, the several hundred demonstrators went to the

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Romanian Embassy. Activists of the Hungarian Industrial Protection Society, the Hungarian Welfare Association, the Movement for Hungarian Unity, and the Association of National Forces were also among the demonstrators. In his speech in front of the Romanian Embassy, Zsolt Lanyi, deputy chairman of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP], stressed that Hungary could not abandon its brothers who are living under Romanian oppression as hostages.

According to the petition formulated by the Bocska Alliance and handed over to the Romanian Embassy in Budapest, the main obstacle hindering the Romanian-Hungarian rapprochement is the almost 80-year-old political practice of raising the forceful assimilation of ethnic minorities to the rank of state policy. The signatories of this petition condemn the antiminorities stipulations of the Romanian education law and call upon the Council of Europe and the governments in Europe and all over the world to help avoid the elimination of one of the largest ethnic minorites in Europe, the ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania.

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Izetbegovic, Tudjman Joint Decisions

Agree on 'Liberated Territories'

AU1909160595 Paris AFP in English
1557 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Sept 19 (AFP)—Bosnia and Croatia, whose troops have made massive inroads into Bosnian Serb territory in the past few days, on Tuesday agreed to negotiate over the fate of the land.

A joint statement issued after talks between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic in the Croatian capital said they had "agreed to settle political arrangements in the liberated territories through dialogue and without taking into account the identity of the armies which have liberated them."

Issue Banja Luka Pledge

AU1909194595 Paris AFP in English
1935 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Sept 19 (AFP)—Croat and Bosnian leaders pledged on Tuesday not to attempt to seize Banja Luka, the largest Bosnian Serb stronghold in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but ruled out halting their offensive in other areas.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic gave an assurance over Banja Luka during a meeting in Zagreb Tuesday with U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke, a State Department spokesman said in Washington.

The spokesman, Nicholas Burns, called the agreement a "welcome development," noting that the United States had asked Zagreb and Sarajevo to end their offensives against the separatist Serbs.

The Croats and the Bosnians have not promised to end their advances against other Bosnian regions, Burns said. He added, however, that there was a "general inclination to slow down or stop offensives."

Bosnian Prime Minister, Haris Silajdzic, in an interview given to official Bosnian television said halting the government offensive "depends on the Serb terrorists behaving and on how they treat the peace process."

He added: "It's not easy to launch or to stop military operations, because these operations have been on-going before. The operation will progress in accordance with the best interest of our defense." [passage omitted]

Croatia had announced Tuesday that it had suspended its military operations, but Bosnia's intentions were not clear.

The Bosnian Serbs have reinforced their defences around their Banja Luka stronghold. The prospect of that city falling is of particular concern to western countries, as it could provoke a reaction from the rump Yugoslavia, which has so far stayed out of the latest fighting.

Sacirbegovic: Army Will Not Enter Banja Luka

AU1909121795 Paris AFP in English
1159 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Report by Diane Bartz]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Sept 19 (AFP)—Croatia has ordered its army to end its offensive in Serb-held areas of Bosnia and will not attack the northern Serb stronghold of Banja Luka, Croatian leaders said Tuesday [19 September], clearing the way for more diplomacy. [passage omitted]

Also in Zagreb, Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic said that Bosnian troops would not enter Banja Luka, the largest Serb-held town in northern Bosnia.

"We have made an offer to the people of Banja Luka, which is to enter into political dialogue to ensure a peaceful transition to the authority of the sovereign Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina," said Sacirbegovic.

"We have no desire to cause any sort of military action to create any sort of panic in the town," said Sacirbey. [passage omitted]

Bildt Sees NATO, Russian Troops Replacing UN

AU2009090895 Paris AFP in English
2103 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stockholm, Sept 19 (AFP)—NATO soldiers may replace UN troops in Bosnia within a few weeks, the European Union mediator in the former Yugoslavia, Carl Bildt, said Tuesday.

"Russian troops will probably be integrated into units commanded by NATO," Bildt said here at a meeting of the Conservative Party, which he heads.

UN Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali said Saturday that he hoped the United Nations' military role could disappear as the peace plan was implemented, Bildt noted.

"The United Nations is experiencing significant financial problems and it can no longer finance its participation in Bosnia," said Bildt, a former Swedish prime minister.

Bildt said the peace process in the former Yugoslavia was threatened by the entry of regular units from the Croatian army into western Bosnia, adding that it could lead to a humanitarian catastrophe of unimaginable proportions.

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In a report to the UN Security Council, Butros-Ghali proposed several options on the subject of the former Yugoslavia including the replacement of the UN peacekeepers with a multinational force which was not under UN orders.

According to plans discussed in Washington and Brussels, NATO will be responsible for the implementation of a peace accord in Bosnia with the deployment of new contingents of troops including US forces.

However in Prague on Tuesday the US Defence Secretary William Perry stressed the United States would not send any troops to Bosnia-Hercegovina until a final peace agreement had been signed by all the parties to the conflict.

Perry, who is touring eastern Europe in advance of a NATO meeting, made the statement while observing military maneouvres at a base in the south of the Czech Republic.

He also told journalists that UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia should not be pulled out before a peace agreement has been reached.

UN: Army, Croats Control 60-65 Percent of Land

AU1909140595 Paris AFP in English
1330 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Sept 19 (AFP)—Joint Croat and Bosnian Government troops appear to have seized control of more than 60 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a UN military source said here on Tuesday [19 September].

"There is a strong probability that the forces of the (Croat-Moslem) Federation are in control of between 60 and 65 percent" of Bosnia, said the source, who declined to be named.

UN: Serbs Continue Gun Withdrawal From Sarajevo

AU2009080395 Paris AFP in English
0736 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Sept 20 (AFP)—More than an additional 100 Bosnian Serb heavy guns have left Sarajevo's exclusion zone, UN officials said, as the countdown began to the second NATO deadline, which runs out Wednesday evening [20 September].

UN officials said the Bosnian Serbs had moved the weapons during Tuesday, the second day of a second three-day period which the Serbs have been given to end their threat to the city, besieged for over 40 months. NATO's second and last deadline for the Bosnian Serbs to pull out the majority of their heavy guns around the city expires at 10:00 p.m. (2000 GMT) Wednesday.

During the first three-day period UN officials said the Serbs pulled back around 160 guns, earning them a 72-hour extension to complete the withdrawal.

One UN official said: "It's looking very good, 90 percent air strikes are off." [sentence as received] Failure by the Serbs to comply with the demand that they remove all their 82-mm mortars and above and all artillery piece of 100-mm or more carried the threat of renewed air strikes.

The weapons' withdrawal has been monitored by French peacekeepers, who set up checkpoints in Serb held areas around the city at three exit points.

Serb Expulsion of Non-Serbs From Banja Luka

AU1909121295 Paris AFP in English
1155 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Sept 19 (AFP)—Hundreds of Moslems still in Serb-held Banja Luka region are being expelled by the Bosnian Serbs into government controlled territory in central Bosnia, UN aid official said Tuesday [19 September].

"It appears that the expulsion of Moslems from Banja Luka to ... central Bosnia has resumed. We have been informed that ... a group of 500 people are expected today (Tuesday)," UNHCR spokesman Mans Nyberg said who added that emergency assistance was being given to these people.

Last Friday, 205 Moslems from Banja Luka arrived in Zenica, the largest government-held town in the centre of the country. The explusions are a direct result of the allied government and Croat offensive in northern Bosnia.

That fighting has pushed an estimated 90,000 Serbs eastwards towards the Banja Luka region creating a humanitarian crisis. International Red Cross spokeswoman Jessica Barry, said the situation was "very tense and the situation is volatile. But it seems pretty calm. Buses are running on the streets and everyone is just waiting to see what is going to happen."

Nyberg said some of these "internal refugees" had been moved out of the town to collective centres in other parts of Serb-held northern Bosnia.

"We are continuing to assist the displaced people in the Banja Luka area where we are releasing all incoming food and non-food items to the local authorities," he said.

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The UNHCR chief of mission in Bosnia, Damaso Feci, was due to go to Banja Luka to assess the situation for three days, Nyberg said.

International Red Cross spokeswoman Jessica Barry said ICRC delegates had visited Prijedor, a town in northwestern Bosnia very close to the current fighting.

"The situation there is extremely grave from a humanitarian point of view. There are up to 30,000 displaced people mostly accommodated in public buildings in 25 different locations in the town," Barry said.

Aid was distributed to these people and others in the town of Derventa, a town close to the Croatian border 60 kilometer (40 miles) northeast of Banja Luka. ICRC delegates also reported some 12,000 people on the road.

However, the aid officials said there were no signs the refugees were making their way to Serbia in the east as the tens of thousands of Serbs from Croatia's Krajina region did in August when their rebel state was crushed by the Croatian army.

Delic Cited on Changed Situation in Bosnia

MM1909150595 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 19 Sep 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Bosnian Army Commander Tells AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: Fate of U.S. Initiative Vague; Language of Arms Reinforced Sarajevo's Position"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb, Brussels, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnian Army, has told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Zagreb that the fate of the recent U.S. initiative could be similar to that of the previous ones. He said: "I have presented four or five plans since I took over as commander of the Bosnian Army in 1993, but none of them has been implemented." He added: "We are currently liberating the land that the Serbs have occupied by the force of arms. And anyone who has drawn one, two, or three maps will be compelled to draw a new one. The situation has now changed in Bosnia, and the victories the Bosnian Army is achieving have reinforced the Sarajevo political leadership's position in the peace talks."

Concerning requesting weapons from the Islamic states, he said that the Bosnian Army "has the right to defend its people and territory like the army of any independent state in the world. But the international community has denied them this right." He added: "Therefore, we are now demanding that this right be upheld by any friendly state that can help us to obtain it." [passage omitted]

Dudakovic Sees War Ending by Year-End

AU1909145295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Mirza Sadikovic report on news conference by General Atif Dudakovic, commander of the Army 5th Corps, on 19 September; place not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Division General Atif Dudakovic, commander of the 5th Corps of the Army of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today addressed a large number of domestic and foreign journalists.

Speaking about the current military situation in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Army's offensive, Gen. Dudakovic said:

[Begin Dudakovic recording] This is the (?seventh) day of our offensive. The 5th Corps has undertaken an operation aimed at liberating the territory of Bosnian Krajina. So far the following towns have been liberated: Bosanski Petrovac, Kljuc, and Bosanska Krupa. Sanski Most has been surrounded. Our aim is to liberate as much territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as possible and link up with the (?other) main military forces. You are aware that in the past three and half years this area has been in total encirclement. After completion of the Croatian Army's Operation Storm, the 5th Corps has [word indistinct] favorable (?conditions) for this advance. The Serbs still have considerable military potential, and despite NATO attacks, especially in this region, the balance of forces has not been (?significantly) disturbed. I stress that all the weapons and equipment, especially the heavy weapons, that are in the possession of the 5th Corps have been captured. [end recording]

In reply to the question where the Serbs are concentrating their forces, and whether they are launching counterattacks, Gen. Dudakovic said:

[Begin Dudakovic recording] They are bringing in fresh units from other fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So far they have brought in the (?11th) Dubica Brigade, the 5th Kozara Brigade, and the Zvornik Brigade. The complete 45th (?Prijedor) Brigade is deployed in the Sanski Most area. It is correct that [words indistinct] However, fighting is under way and our job as soldiers is to fight. Certain brigades that were on the fronts around [word indistinct] and east Bosnia yesterday and the day before yesterday [words indistinct] Sanski Most and Mrkonjic Grad. [end recording]

Journalists were especially interested in whether the 5th Army Corps will continue the offensive until a political solution has been found. Here is what Gen. Dudakovic said:

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[Begin Dudakovic recording] I know the ability of my forces best, and when the conditions have been created for liberation, I [words indistinct] It is correct that I receive my orders from my senior commanders [words indistinct] I have certain initiative. [words indistinct] the liberation of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the state [word indistinct]. [end recording]

Gen. Dudakovic also stressed that the losses among the chetnik ranks are enormous, that the military spoils are great, and that the 5th Corps, as he said, is lifting the embargo by itself. He stressed that he is an optimist regarding the completion of the entire liberation operation, and that he believes that the war will end by the end of the year.

Croats Launch Offensive Across Sava River

AU1909102795 Paris AFP in English 1006 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Zagreb, Sept 19 (AFP)—[Passage omitted] In Sarajevo, UN officials said Tuesday [19 September] a three-pronged Croatian Army offensive into northern Bosnia began at 1000 a.m. (0800 GMT) Monday, with troops crossing the Sava River and shelling several towns.

"At 1000 hours yesterday (Monday) the Croatian Army launched a three-pronged attack at 1000 at Dvor, [Bosanska] Kostajnica and [Bosanska] Dubica across the Sava River into northern Bosnia, it is not clear how far they advanced," UN spokesman Chris Gunness said.

Earlier the UN officials said Bosnian and Croat forces were continuing to advance against Serbs Tuesday, pushing them back towards the Serbs' northern stronghold of Banja Luka, UN officials said. [passage omitted]

Article Sets Down Conditions for Settlement

AU1909103095 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Muhamed Filipovic, leader of the Liberal Bosniak Organization and Bosnian ambassador to Britain: "Conditions for Signature"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What is our present situation like and does it dictate that we must accept the plan offered to us?

I am convinced that our situation has considerably improved and that it might improve even more. Two years ago we were in a difficult situation, and we could use the argument at that time that we were waging a war against two sides, that we had lost a large part of the territory with the possibility that even more territory could be lost, we were also in a very difficult position regarding the situation in many enclaves and towns or cities such as Gorazde, Sarajevo, Zepa, Srebrenica, Maglaj, Mostar, Zepce, or Bihac, but the present situation is considerably different. We now practically have only two weak points—Gorazde and Sarajevo.

The Power of the Army

Today we are not waging a war against two sides. On the contrary, one of these sides is helping us, since it has the same interests as we do. Two years ago, when some of the ideas being offered now appeared, such as a union of two states and giving up of eastern regions as well as the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into two states, our chances were not especially good. The situation in the army and state authorities was not good, since everything was in the process of development, and, apart from that, there were special difficulties regarding logistics, but all this is significantly different now. It cannot be assumed that the Washington agreement between the Croats and the Muslims was made only in order to prepare the situation for the reduction of Bosnia to two states and in order to be the basis for a partition of Bosnia.

Seen from the point of view of the control of territories, the situation in the state structures and the military situation in general, it can be claimed that our position is much better now. First of all, we now have a functioning state, although there are difficulties and impediments, but its existence is felt in the whole territory controlled by the government. We control more territory than ever before since the very beginning of the war. At the beginning of the war, our country was totally occupied, and the Yugoslav People's Army controlled almost 95 percent of our national territory. According to my estimations, we control more than 40 percent of that territory today. Regarding the balance of forces at the front lines, it has come to changes that have to be recognized as significant even by the biggest skeptics, even by the people like Christopher and Perry, who said that we had lost the war. And all previous peace plans were made according to the thesis that we lost the war. Our army is powerful now and it controls the most important strategic positions.

If we add all those reasons that are not always visible from outside, but which are practically the most important, since they include the issue of the rights of a nation and the legal basis for a change of the constitutional order in the sense of a reduction or radical weakening of the functions of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the whole thing becomes much more clear. We are the legal and legitimate power of a state that has been universally recognized and that is a UN member. This status

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resulted from the recognition of a unitary state with legal and legitimate authorities all over its territory.

The attack against the territory and constitutional order of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international situation that developed from it, since we are a subject according to international law, was the basis for the condemnations of the Serbian aggression and pillage by relevant institutions of the international community, first of all the UN Security Council and the European Community as well as other international institutions. This situation makes one conclude that no one can impose a solution on us, especially not a solution that would change the constitutional order and relations within the country, unless military force is used, and there is no such force in our country now, apart from the possibility that the Rapid Reaction Force is deployed.

This can neither be done by someone from abroad nor by any existing authority in the country, except in a way foreseen by the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Because of all that, our country—although we badly need peace and although we are the ones who have suffered most from the aggression during this war—must not and cannot accept any agreement that would not provide at least for the following elements necessary for the existence of our state and nation.

The Principles of Peace

1. Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain a state, and the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the only constitutional and legal subject with the exclusive international legal identity.

2. The territorial partition, as the solution to internal relations, should be established on the principle that no territories having a majority population of one nation can be administered by another nation. The only criterion should be the 1991 census, and ethnic cleansing and genocide cannot have an influence on the situation and relations, since this would not only be the legalization of ethnic cleansing and genocide but also a present for the aggressor for the committed crimes of aggression, genocide, and devastation of the country.

3. Substate entities cannot and must not be created unless their basis is the recognition of all national, human, economic, and other rights of all people.

4. All those who have been responsible for committing crimes, violence of all kind, or violation of laws and principles of life in civilized human communities must be excluded from the decisionmaking process about the destiny of the state and its people and tried and prosecuted as criminals.

5. The damage the innocent population of Bosnia-Herzegovina has suffered from any military or political formation must be put out of effect in the legal sense, and the damage inflicted by such procedures or decisions must be paid for.

We can accept peace offers only under these conditions. If the United States of America is ready to accept these principles of peace and if it is ready to express them in an appropriate way in the text of their peace proposal, we shall not have any reason to refuse such a proposal.

Karadzic: Enemy 'Must Be Stopped Militarily'

LD1909153995 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1527 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Sept. 19 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic said on Tuesday that the Bosnian Serb army (BSA) had consolidated its defences in northern and western Bosnia and that the advances of Croatia's regular army and forces of the Muslim-Croat federation had to be stopped by military means.

Although the advances and territorial gains will not be recognized in the final peace settlement, the Croatian army and forces of the Muslim-Croat federation must be stopped militarily and the occupied territories must be returned, Karadzic's office said in a statement.

An order to this effect has been issued to the BSA which will use its legitimate right to defence, since Bosnian Serb towns have been shelled from Croatian territory too, the statement said. The Bosnian Serb republic will not accept the situation created as a result of NATO bombings ... since a similar mood exists in the international community, ancestral Serb lands will be returned to the Bosnian Serb republic by political means, but also by resorting to military means, the statement said.

Bosnian Serb Vice President Nikola Koljevic told a press conference in the western Bosnian Serb town of Banja Luka on Tuesday that the Croat-Muslim offensive 'represents a tragic development not only for the Serb people, but also for the peace process.' Koljevic said he believed that the conquests would not be recognized and that they had to be stopped in the interest of peace. 'The victims of the offensive are primarily civilians, who were the target of Croat-Muslim continuous shelling,' he said and added that civilian casualties had by far exceeded the number of those killed in action.

According to Koljevic, the international community can find no excuse for the fact that the Croat-Muslim offensive followed NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb republic.

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Koljevic said that civilian targets in Novi Grad, Kozarska Dubica, Gradiska, Kostajnica and elsewhere in northwestern Bosnia were shelled from Croatian territory, and that Croatian troops tried to force the Sava and Una rivers in the same region.

'Public Announcement' by Karadzic's Office

AU1909161295 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The office of the president of the Serb Republic has issued a public announcement, which says:

Though the progress and the territorial conquests of the territory of the Serb Republic on the part of the Croatian Army and the forces of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be acknowledged in the final solution, they must be stopped militarily and the occupied territory retrieved. The order to do so has already been issued, and the Army of the Serb Republic has already consolidated the defense in all the areas—from [Mount] Ozren, through [Mount] Vlasic, the canyon of the Vrbas River, the valley of the Sana River, Mount Grmec, and to the valley of the Una River.

Moreover, Serb towns are being shelled from the territory of the Republic of Croatia. The Serb Republic has the legitimate right to defense, including retaliation against selected targets. Unless the shelling from the territory of Croatia stops, the Army of the Serb Republic will retaliate in accordance with the international military law.

The Serb Republic will not accept the situation that arose as a consequence of the NATO bombing, and there are some in the international community who feel the same. The centuries-old Serb territory will be brought back into the Serb Republic by political means, but primarily military ones.

Koljevic Says Serbs Will Defend Banja Luka

AU2009085095 Paris AFP in English 2133 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Ljubomir Milasin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bijeljina, Bosnia Hercegovina, Sept 19 (AFP)—A war council in Banja Luka has decided to defend the town against any attacks from Croatian or government forces, the Bosnian Serb "vice president" said Tuesday.

Speaking here to journalists en route to Banja Luka, Nikola Koljevic said authorities there were prepared if necessary to appeal to Belgrade for aid.

"Everything depends on the situation, which changes from hour to hour," he added.

On the offer of "dialogue" made by Bosnian Foreign Minister Mohammed Sacirbegovic to Bosnian Serbs in Banja Luka, the vice president said it was unlikely to happen. "People are too bitter for that because they have been thrown out of their homes by Croatian and Moslem forces, especially the Croatians," he added.

Koljevic described the third wave of lightning attacks launched by Croatians as "very bad for the peace process." He added: "We were expecting a ceasefire throughout Bosnia after the agreement to withdraw heavy arms from around Sarajevo. We signed the accord in Geneva, we withdrew the guns and, what do you know, what happened to the peace process?"

Koljevic said he hoped the five-nation "contact group" comprising Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States would bring pressure to bear on Bosnian and Croatian forces to stop them fighting. "It must stop. Even if it is a coincidence, it must be recognised that the NATO bombardments have made it easier for the Moslems and the Croatians," complained Koljevic.

Commenting on the rapid advance of Bosnian and Croatian forces and the patchy counter-attacks by Serb forces, he said Croatian forces had shelled behind Serb lines targeting villages of militiamen who were responsible for containing their advance.

He said this tactic had forced the men to retreat as they were worried about their families. He added that refugees, whose number has been estimated at between 80,000 and 100,000 by Serb authorities, were spread throughout Bosnian Serb-held territory and did not want to cross over the River Drina into Serbia.

On Tuesday there were no visible signs of mass movement of refugees on the road leading from the border towards Banja Luka.

Asked about the health of Bosnian Serb military leader General Ratko Mladic, whose whereabouts are currently unknown, Koljevic said that he had been ill but he was now well enough to resume command of his troops.

Koljevic Expects Cessation of Hostilities

LD2009100295 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0928 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept 20 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb Vice-President Nikola Koljevic said on Tuesday that the Serbs were expecting an agreement on cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia.

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Koljevic hinted to reporters in Bijeljina that the Serb side had accepted the Geneva agreement and pulled back their heavy weaponry 20 km from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, foreign news agencies have reported. The U.N. deadline for the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons expires Wednesday at 2200 GMT.

This is what the peace accord has come to, said Koljevic, adding that a new Muslim-Croat offensive was under way in northwestern Bosnia. Koljevic said Croatia's third blitz war was detrimental to the peace process, but said he hoped the international Contact Group would exert pressure on the sides that have commenced war operations to stop.

He said the NATO bombing of Serb military and civilian objects had made things easier for the Muslims and Croats.

Some of the territories conquered are priority regions and the Serbs will demand that they be returned, said Koljevic, but did not say what regions he was referring to.

Krajisnik Questions Rifkind's Decision To Mediate

LD1909191995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1745 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 19 Sep (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic [RS], is not surprised at Muslim Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic's demand that Foreign Office Secretary Malcolm Rifkind mediate in negotiations with the Banja Luka authorities.

"I am not surprised at Sacirbegovic's cynicism and audacity, as that is his established style; what does surprise me is that Mr. Rifkind agreed to the abuse of his authority," Krajisnik explained in a statement for SRNA.

"We were expecting condemnation and demands for the Muslim-Croat offensive to be halted, which came in the wake of NATO's air strikes, and threats that Muslim positions will be bombed following their offensive from the Bihac safe area," said the RS Assembly speaker, and, noting that all this had not materialized, asked: "Whatever happened to unbiased British diplomacy?"

Announcing the continuation of the aggression on the western parts of the Serb Republic at a joint news conference with Rifkind yesterday, Sacirbegovic cynically added that the Muslim authorities were ready to open dialogue with the official leadership of the Banja Luka region, so the population of Banja Luka "could stay in their homes and the town would not become a battlefield."

He proposed Rifkind as mediator in this dialogue, to which the British diplomat responded by saying that this proposal should be interpreted as a fresh and important political dialogue, which might represent a basis for peace in the entire country.

Krajisnik recalled that the Serb Republic leadership always meticulously studied all proposals, even those coming from the enemy, but added that Sacirbegovic's proposal could be qualified as inappropriate and provocative.

"His arrogance is based on unrealistic assumptions and illusions. The Muslim side's intentions are inevitably leading to the continuation of this bloody war," the Serb assembly speaker warned.

He described Sacirbegovic's statement as "indicative," because it ignores any kind of agreement on a peaceful solution to the crisis and represents a clumsy imitation of the behavior of the authorities in Croatia.

"Unfortunately, our enemies—supported by the United Nations, NATO, and their mentors—have dashed hopes for a political solution and have set the stage for a military solution," Krajisnik noted and added: "The Serb Republic will always work toward a political solution, but will not give up its intention to regain its occupied ethnic and historical territories and punish the enemy."

Serb Assembly President Krajisnik Interviewed

LD1409225995 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 14 Sep 95

[Interview with Bosnian Serb assembly president Momcilo Krajisnik by Pale TV anchorman Vedran Skoro in Pale—live; interview is interspersed with reports about fighting in Bosnia]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Skoro] Good evening, esteemed viewers. Our guest this evening is the president of the Serb Republic Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik. Good evening and welcome to our program.

[Krajisnik] Good evening.

[Skoro] Mr. President, the information service of the 1st Krajina Corps of the Serb Republic Army [VRS] today announced that Croatian Army troops had entered Jajce after battles to defend the road leading to Jajce from Sipovo. We know that a serious Muslim and Croat offensive has been raging against the southern and southwestern borders of the Serb Republic in a joint action with NATO, which helped them by heavily bombing the area. What is actually happening?. What caused the Serb defense lines to be moved?

[Krajisnik] Well, when something like this happens, when there is a breakthrough of defense lines, all kinds

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of information and disinformation appear. The truth is that there have been NATO actions for some time—they stopped or at least were temporarily frozen today—which had a serious effect on the defense capability of our enemy. Bombing was random, not just of military facilities, but also civilian targets, causing unrest among civilians and greatly assisting our enemy.

NATO is actively participating in this battle on the side of our enemy, and we have serious problems in the western part of our republic. These problems are now being overcome and we shall both settle the situation and liberate our areas. We have to defend our ethnic areas not just because of the political concept of the situation or because of day-to-day politics [sentence as heard]. NATO has committed a big crime, tribute [danak] was paid, tribute which should be deeply analyzed and which had been predetermined in order to assist our enemy: the Croatian regular army, the Croat Defense Council [HVO], and the Muslim army. [sentence as heard]

[Skoro] NATO has assisted our enemy—Muslims and Croats—both NATO and the United Nations. However, a report came through today that Butrus Butrus Ghali and Willy Claes, the UN and NATO secretaries general, called on the Muslims and Croats to stop their offensive in this area and in former Bosnia-Herzegovina in general. Will the Muslims and Croats listen to them and will the United Nations and NATO impose any sanctions against them it they disobey?

[Krajisnik] They will impose no sanctions because NATO—Mr. Claes and all of them—are directing their efforts toward helping the Muslims and Croats. What I would like to say concerning this report is that an agreement has been reached—on which we will comment later—whereby Mr. Clarke of the United States promised to use all his influence with NATO and with the United Nations to warn the Muslims and Croats that they must not take advantage of NATO air strikes. This actually happened. It is a positive move and a guarantee that the people at this level, who have taken on certain responsibilities, have started to adhere to them. I am pleased to see that a general, who has honor, has actually carried out his duty. How this will be realized—we must not doubt it if the warning to the Muslims and Croats is sincere. They are doing everything following their orders and this will be realized [as heard].

[Skoro] Let's stick to the southern and southwestern borders of the Serb Republic. We know that the other borders are firm and stable and that the enemy has had no success. However, foreign media and our enemy's media speak of alleged successes along the Drvar-Petrovac lines and near Srbobran. What is the current situation there?

[Krajisnik] I said earlier that this entire area is in a difficult position, but not alarming as our enemy are trying to claim. It is true that every town becomes a deep wound when something like this happens, but we must consolidate our ranks following NATO's horrific attacks. We have even been informed that NATO was not the only one to participate. Croatian planes took part and even Turkish ones, on their own initiative and taking advantage of the confused situation to weaken the positions.

You have seen that our army positions were attacked in Vojkovici, Srbobran, and elsewhere; hence this is an active participation of NATO and—under its auspices—of our enemies who take advantage of the situation. This is a very complex situation. We have big problems with disrupted communications. The measures we have taken after this freezing of NATO air strikes... [pauses] we will consolidate. [passage omitted]

[Skoro] What can we expect in the days to come, and can we refer to NATO aggression in the past tense?

[Krajisnik] You see, NATO has committed a horrific crime. We can establish the consequences in one way or another, but this is a substitute for the failure Clinton could suffer if his veto on the arms embargo is not eliminated. This was a deal and we could have stood on our heads, but the bombing would still have taken place.

The invented massacre, i.e. the invented blame put on the Serbs, was just a pretext, since the Serbs had to be disarmed, heavy weapons had to be withdrawn, and the defense of Serb Sarajevo had to be prevented. The aim was to give Sarajevo to the Muslims and quickly end the war. This would have been NATO's drawing of maps in the east. They were not successful and there is now an agreement to freeze NATO activities. We have agreed—an agreement was reached in Belgrade—our representatives, President Karadzic, Deputy President Koljevic, General Tolimir, and I were in Belgrade. We reached an agreement with the U.S. side which will be submitted to the Muslim side. It is quite a new agreement—instead of the Serbs withdrawing heavy weapons, the Muslim heavy weapons will also have to be controlled. This is not a withdrawal but a redeployment of heavy weapons. [passage omitted]

[London Bureau is herwith suspending filing. Filing will be resumed after 0900 GMT on 15 September]

[Skoro] Mr. President, we have already touched on the agreement reached in Belgrade yesterday, and also today Western diplomatic sources report that progress

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has been achieved in yesterday's talks between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and U.S. negotiator Richard Holbrooke. They say that the greatest progress is in the agreement on Sarajevo. In other words, this question of Sarajevo, which is considered a key issue and perhaps the greatest problem for division, is as far as the maps are concerned on the way to being solved. What does all this mean, and what are the specific conclusions, is it possible to learn what this agreement on Sarajevo, or the lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo, contains?

[Krajisnik] We had talks, as I said a little while ago, in which the main topic was Sarajevo and the cessation of the bombing by NATO aircraft. A major step forward has been taken toward the normalization of life in Sarajevo and certain preconditions for future negotiations. First of all, this agreement establishes a cessation of hostilities that is very important in the Sarajevo exclusion zone. Second, there is to be monitoring of weapons on both sides, of heavy weapons, so that we are put in the same position. Third, the heavy weaponry is as defined under international war law, and fifth [as heard] the guarantee for establishing peace in Sarajevo are not merely signatures to some decree, but rather behind this stands NATO, the United Nations, and of course the guarantee for all people are the people themselves.

I have to say that the Serb people of Sarajevo have defended Sarajevo on two occasions. Once when there was the major offensive against Sarajevo and when the Muslim forces, under the patronage of course of the United Nations who tolerated this, attacked Sarajevo and thought they would lift the blockade of Sarajevo, in effect take Serb Sarajevo. The second time during this bombardment. The resoluteness, resistance, anger, pride, and strength of Serb Sarajevo has been to such an extent turned by the media to our advantage that the false slogan that Sarajevo is Muslim and that the Serbs have no right to Sarajevo has been completely turned around, so that today, as Mr. Holbrooke has already said and other politicians think the same, these Serbs do exist and if they are so determined, so strong, and if they are here then they have to be taken into account, and Sarajevo must be transformed into two cities. We will use this situation, which we have politically through the media and militarily sustained, and the successes we have achieved, to put Sarajevo at the center of future talks. [passage omitted]

[Skoro] After everything that has happened to us can we trust the international community?

[Krajisnik] I will give you my personal opinion—I have no trust in them whatsoever, and our people must know that. We must not trust a nation that reneged on the agreement, i.e. that took Mt. Bjelasnica and Mt. Igman and then handed them over to the Muslims. We cannot trust NATO that—for no reason at all—fabricated the problem of Markale. When I say fabricated, I would like to add something for the sake of truth, forgive me for digressing. We have reliable reports. We know that we did not commit the massacre. One shell could not have done it and the Serbs did not do it. We also know that the Muslims did not do it either. It was done by those who today had good reasons for bombing this area and for setting the Serbs and Muslims against each other, although we are already enemies.

However, it will be fair to say it was not done by the Muslims, but by those who are now watching how the Serbs and Muslims are quarreling and how the Muslims are rejoicing at NATO bombing the Serbs, while tomorrow they will rejoice when the Serbs attack the Muslims. Both, and especially the Muslims, are the victims of this plot. [passage omitted]

The propaganda, which says we want to swap Sarajevo for Gorazde, has been fabricated. We are certainly not going to allow Sarajevo to be linked up with Gorazde, as this will cut through our territory. We will have nothing against this link if it can be done without cutting through our territory. We will never ever offer to swap Gorazde for Sarajevo. If the Muslims want it to remain as an enclave in our territory with all the rights we will have nothing against it. No territory will be, if I may say so, [ethnically] clean. There will be Serbs in the Muslim territory. There will be Muslims in the Serb territory. Why should we mind if Muslims from Gorazde remained. But if they wanted to make a deal we will examine it, as it is not natural that Gorazde should remain an enclave in our territory at this historic moment when borders are being decided once and for all. [passage omitted]

[Skora] Let us return to the peace agreement, i.e. the upcoming peace talks. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's office today announced that talks between all three warring sides can be expected soon. The six-member FRY-Serb Republic delegation will be led by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Its members have already been selected in accordance with the Belgrade agreement of 30 August.

[Krajisnik] You see, our enemies have always developed their strategy on the basis of the disunity of the Serb people. I have many objections to the official policies in Serbia and Montenegro. They have hindered us a great deal, but we give all due credit to the people in Serbia who have done a lot. However, the state comes first. We will leave these objections to the postwar

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period. We have built a joint platform, we have a joint representation. The results of it can already be seen in practice. [passage omitted]

[Skora] So we can expect peace soon here?

[Krajisnik] I think the peace can be expected soon. We in Sarajevo, and in other areas as well, must know that over the next two to three weeks all the horrors of war will be behind us. Naturally, although we will be enemies living separately in two states, we will still depend on each other. Therefore, it is better to build better mutual relations, transform Sarajevo into two cities. It is not worth at this moment to lose one single life if at all possible. The Serbs will defend themselves and certainly die for their territory, but they will not engage in offensive actions in the Sarajevo area. However, if someone were to try and renege on this agreement and attack the Serbs in Sarajevo, the continuation of the war will be certain and—as Mr. Holbrooke said—the key to the solution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis as a whole is Sarajevo. Let us hope, let us be optimistic that peace will come. We all want it, and what we got and what is a great blessing from God, and what the Serbs deserve to have—is our own state, so that all our sufferings and victims have not been in vain. That is the most important thing, not for this generation, they, i.e. we will have little time to enjoy it, but for our future generations, for our sons, daughters, and grandchildren. [passage omitted]

I appeal to the Serbs in the eastern part of our republic and to the Serbs in Serbia and Montenegro to do everything they can to preserve the western parts of our republic. If the amount of our territory is reduced in accordance with the wishes of our enemies we will have no Serb Republic. According to a recent thesis, it is important to preserve Podrinje [Drina valley], i.e. the eastern part of the republic, while there is no interest in the western parts. We must never allow this. The Serbs from Sarajevo, Podrinje, [word indistinct], and Herzegovina and elsewhere must all help preserve the western borders. We do not want the republic if it is reduced to this. Without our [Bosnian] Krajina and without the Serb Krajina our people will never sleep peacefully. Hence the need to protect the Serbs in Knin, who are counting on our protection. As you have seen, the women and children did not want to leave until their issue was resolved. We owe it to them to protect them. [passage omitted]

SGV Appeal to UN To Stop Serb 'Exodus'

AU1909151295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Civic Council [SGV] has sent a message to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali, General Bernard Janvier, commander of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] for the former Yugoslavia, and Gen. Rupert Smith, UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, warning them that, owing to the latest military operations, as stated, there is a mass exodus of Serb civilian population in the towns of the Bosnian Krajina.

The SGV demands that you establish contact with the organs of local authority in Banja Luka and other towns, offer protection to the civilians from military operations, and prevent a new exodus of people.

This is necessary in order to avoid the exodus of the civilian population such as the exodus of civilians in Knin Krajina and the Republic of Croatia. A further deterioration of the situation can endanger the peace process and efforts to find a political solution to the Bosnian war drama.

Regardless of the possible balance of forces, it is of paramount importance that the Serb people remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina as, without the Serb people, there will be no stable future Bosnia-Herzegovina nor peace in the region, the message issued by the SGV and signed by Mirko Pejanovic states.

Bosnian Serbs Worry About Redrawing of Borders

Plavsic Accuses Croatia

AU1809160495 Paris AFP in English 1529 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept 18 (AFP)—The direct participation of Croatia "in the aggression against the Serb Republic" belies the description of the Bosnian conflict as a "civil war" and is aimed at "drawing a new map in Croatia's favor," Bosnian Serb leaders said Monday [18 September].

The vice president of the self-declared Serb Republic, Biljana Plavsic, accused Croatia in a radio broadcast Monday of "redrawing the map of Bosnia by occupying as much territory as possible," according to the independant BETA news agency.

Plavsic said that Croatia had taken advantage of the weakening of Serb forces by NATO air raids and Croat-Moslem offensives.

She also applauded the statement by British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind that the recent gains of Croat

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forces on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina would not influence an eventual accord on the division of territory.

Plavsic denied rumors that Serb leaders had agreed to a transfer of territory in western Bosnia.

Radovan Karadzic, the rebel Serb "president," also denied over the weekend that such an accord existed, reported the independent daily, NASA BORBA.

He denounced the "Croat aggression," asserting that "we can no longer talk about a 'civil war' because of the direct involvement of forces from Croatia." Karadzic deplored the damage caused by NATO air raids and emphasized that Croatia "possesses sophisticated arms and an unconcealed appetite for fighting."

At the same time, however, he held out the hope that an accord could be reached for the Sarajevo region, from which rebel Serb forces have withdrawn about half of their heavy artillery beyond the 20-kilometer (12.5-mile) exclusion zone. Some 120,000 Serbs live in the southern part of Sarajevo.

Karadzic said that an agreement had been reached between U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on the deployment of 25,000 Russian troops to guarantee a cease-fire around Sarajevo.

"If the Moslems agree, we can have the signatures in four days and could extend the accord to the entire region," he said.

Croats, Muslims Using NATO

LD1909123895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1206 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Sept 19 (TANJUG)—Using NATO's aggression on Bosnian Serbs the Croat-Muslim coalition is cutting up the map of Bosnia with arms.

Croats and Muslims were so 'frightened' by warnings from the world that they should not use air strikes for conquests that they are now even publicly announcing their future objectives.

Guided by the logic of what you grab is yours, the regular Croatian troops, which include elite guard brigades, are attacking a seriese of towns in the Bosnian Serb republic, Republika Srpska, while the diplomatic peace initative is in progress.

Croatia's propaganda does not neglect to find 'arguments' to justify the offensive saying it is in fact 'liberating' what had allegedly always belonged to the Croats. It even puts Grahovo on that list, an occupied town in the southwest of Republika Srpska in which the Serbs have long been a majority population.

Zagreb says that the Croatian border traverses 'somwehere near Bihac' (a Muslim-majority town in norwestern Bosnia), and claims the Bihac Airport, part of which is built inside Mt Pljesevica and which cost the former Yugoslavia over four billion dollars. It seems, however, that the border does not have to be 'somewhere near Bihac', judging by the parliament address of the deputy of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) Hrvoje Sisic.

Sisic said that his heart leapt when he learnt that 'the Croatian Army had entered Croatian Jajce for the first time since 1943'. The Croatian fascists—the ustasha—were in Jajce (central Bosnia) up until 1943. The town was part of the puppet Nazi Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in which over a million Serbs were killed.

Sisic told the deputies 'not to sabotage what the Croatian Government has to do—to create a Croatian state in territory as large as possible'.

HDZ Secretary-General Zlatko Canjuga does not believe that Croatia will be able to 'return all historic Croatian territories' but that it will certainly not leave Banja Luka, a centuries old Croatian stronghold in that part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the Serbs.

'If it is possible we shall go all the way to the Drina (the river which forms the natural border between Bosnia and Yugoslavia),' Canujuga said.

Representatives of the Tudjman regime for the creation of a greater Croatia are drawing up the most ambitious scenarios while the Zagreb daily VJESNIK wrote that prospects are gradually being opened to Croatia to join the club of world policy makers. Croatia has gone to the point where it has lost all criteria and is multiplying demands to resolve war by war, so that it is advising Muslims not to rush into accepting different peace proposals even if they are offered by the U.S.

One of the advises dealt by Zagreb is that it is irrelevant what the Muslims have signed in Geneva and that the only important thing is that the (Muslim government) fifth corps commander Atif Dudakovic knows what he has to do and that he goes ahead and does it.

SGV Urges Banja Luka Serbs To Negotiate

AU1909122395 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian Civic Council [SGV] of Bosnia-Herzegovina has appealed to the Serb people in the Bosnian Krajina [words indistinct].

It has become obvious in recent days into what kind of tragedy the Pale regime has led the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, when the Pale

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regime is losing, so are the innocent Serb people. Organize your own local authorities, ask the UN Protection Force to set up talks with the state authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and protect the civilian population from the consequences of war operations.

No one can take away your right to a free existence, national equality, and local autonomy. Ask the international community and the bodies of authority of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose citizens you are, to guarantee you this right. Elect citizens' delegations in Banja Luka and other towns for talks with representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and the international community. Express your desire for a peaceful existence with your neighbors Croats and Bosniaks in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A part of the Serb people living in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Mostar [words indistinct] SGV, with the support of the international community to protect the human, civil, and national rights in Banja Luka and other towns controlled by the Pale regime.

An SGV delegation is currently negotiating human rights guarantees with U.S. officials in Washington. Remain in your ancestral homes; prove to yourself and your neighbors, the Croats and Bosniaks, that it is possible to live in conditions of equal rights for all people who respect the values of contemporary European civilization, the statement of the SGV of Bosnia- Herzegovina reads.

Daily Investigates Mladic's Hospitalization

AU1909151395 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Sep 95 p 16

[Report by D.P.: "Officially—Checked Into the Military Medical Academy; Unofficially—Isn't in the Urology Department"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—"Several days ago," the commander of the Serb Republic Army, General Ratko Mladic, "was taken to hospital due to urologic problems, that is, problems with kidney stones, and will undergo surgery in the coming days," Momcilo Krajisnik told a Russian parliamentary delegation in Pale two days ago. The news gave rise to much speculation, even that Gen. Mladic has been "removed for a spell"; among journalists' circles, there has even been speculation that he has been arrested following the alleged split with Milosevic some 10 days ago.

Colonel Milos Fet, head of the Belgrade Military Medical Academy's Information Service told us yesterday that Gen. Mladic is in the hospital.

"Ratko Mladic checked into the Military Medical Academy several days ago and is currently in the urology department, where he is awaiting surgery. His condition is not serious, but the general is not talking to anyone, including journalists. You know, when a person is in pain, they hate themselves and the entire world," Col. Fet told NASA BORBA.

Asked to give us more detailed information about Gen. Mladic's state of health and the aforementioned rumors, our collocutor answered that "he could not say anything more." He added that, if the need arises for some sort of statement for the public, it will be released by the Yugoslav Army General Staff's Information Service.

Wishing to know more about Ratko Mladic's condition, we phoned the urology department of the Military Medical Academy. "Who told you that the general is in this department?" a nurse with a vivid Bosnian accent inquired. When we explained, she said curtly: "That is misinformation."

NATO Seen as Having German 'Militant Ambitions'

AU1509210195 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 12 Sep 95 p 2

[Commentary by Mirko Stamenkovic: "U.S. 'Tomahawk' Diplomacy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the Serbian YES in Bosnia, the Geneva agreement, and Russia's angry warning that it has finally realized what a high price Europe has paid for its easy agreement to place all UN comands in NATO hands, Clinton is still in a warrior mood and NATO bombers are still killing civilians in Bosnia.

Their planes are providing open support to the Muslim-Croat land offensive on the Serb army. The "desperados" in the military cabinet of the U.S. President have won, and now the Serbs in Bosnia are being attacked by "cruising missiles," because at the beginning of the presidential campaign, the phantom destructions with bombers do not seem spectacular enough! The "Tomahawk" missiles came from the Adriatic, from the "Normandy" and "Roosevelt" ships—what an irony and cynicism!

Three Scars

Once NATO finally comes back to earth—and that is inevitable, as it has always been, whenever peace was imposed by force—Europe will have three big and historically significant scars:

First, NATO is not a harmless toy for defense from Bolshevism and the "horror of communism," but a "squadron of death" in the service of the "Family" of

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the political and imperial mafia for all those who do not obey. It is hard to believe that the wise people of England, France, Spain, and middle and northern Europe do not want to realize that. They are silent because they have defended themselves that way for centuries—that is until they themselves were endangered;

Second, Germanic militarism has become much more cunning and more dangerous than from the beginning and middle of the century, when it discovered its intentions right away through military demonstrations. Obeying and accepting the full domination of Americans, the vengeful Germanic spirit has disguised itself and acquired full control of the economic supremacy over Europe. It let the United States do the dirty work of their centuries-long aspirations to expand toward warm seas;

And third, it seems that the emigration of "German military and scientific brains" to the United States after the war completely changed the mentality of that multinational state. Instead of the earlier, isolationist United States, which was hardly moved even by a world catastrophe, today we have the United States as the "world policeman," a country that imposes exclusively its own standards of democracy and human rights by throwing a carpet of bombs and which no longer considers only Asia to be its "hunting ground," but also ousts Europe before a dilemma: Is it not the true intention of the former colonists to become the colonizers of the Old Lady [Europe]?!

Preparations for the New War

It is not accidental that it was precisely Kinkel, German minister of foreign affairs, who degraded the anxiety and anger of Yeltsin to the remark that they were "intended for the domestic public only," because elections await Russia in December.

It has almost gone unnoticed, even by observant diplomatic analysts, that FRG Prime Minister Kohl has precisely now remembered the fact that after World War II, 12 million ethnic Germans experienced exodus—and the world is upset about the destiny of 200,000 refugees from Krajina and western Slavonia! Nothing happens accidentally in politics. If that served Kohl as an inspiration—from our territory insignificantly few ethnic Germans fled with Hitler's fascists. Those who had committed crimes. Most of them fled from the borderlands of Poland, the Czech Republic, or France.

Only in this century did the Germans pay for their militant ambitions—twice, very dearly. Those who do not learn their lesson once tend to make the same mistake again and again. They have come back to the Balkans without war. To whom is Kohl sending messages about the earlier exodus?

The Russians seem to have lost their chance to act in the Security Council, and it is senseless to expect that anybody will give them another chance to use their veto, particularly when it comes to the war in Bosnia or the stopping of NATO air strikes. Yeltsin is concerned that NATO has come to his very borders. That has, doubtlessly, been impressed deep in the consciousness of Russian people, precisely now in the finals of the preelection campaign.

Breakthrough of Islam

All that can somehow be explained. The United States is on the verge of an economic war with Japan. Soon it will be in the same situation as Germany, because up until now, that has always been concealed by customs conflicts with the European Union. Now it is already clear to everyone that the Germans dictate the conditions within that union.

Yeltsin, or somebody else, must bring back the centuries-old dignity of Russia. Because, it is a big and powerful country. Its military potentials are not insignificant.

What leads Europe to the verge of a new war is precisely the shortsighted policy of the West when it comes to Bosnia. What can Clinton's diplomacy solve with a "carpet of bombs and Tomahawk missiles"?

Hardly anything. It will leave a wasteland in communications and radio-television infrastructure and it will destroy transmission lines and waterworks. It will kill thousands of civilians. All that is the civilized and not military aspect of the conscience of the world! In the genes of Serbs, a "code" will be cut—that one cannot trust the United States any more. And that it is equally dangerous and militant, as Germans or ustashas.

The thesis about the creation of a balance of powers through the destruction of Serb supremacy in heavy arms is a lame excuse and means nearly nothing from the aspect of military appeasement. Both Serbs and Croats have had that supremacy during the entire war, and yet they have not definitely defeated the Muslims militarily. It is an illusion to believe that the "Tomahawk" missiles will exile the Serbs from Bosnia.

Finally, Europe has to think about the U.S. intention to create an Islamic transversal from Istanbul to Paris with other people's soldiers. The U.S. presence in Albania, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], and the breakthrough of Islamic fundamentalists in Paris would have to sober up the sleepy heads of western states. For centuries, Europe has had Krajinas to defend it from an Islamic breakthrough. Now it destroys those border guards not only militarily but also physically. Why?

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Joint Statement on Bosnia-Croatia-U.S. Talks

LD1909190795 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After two and a half hours of talks between the leaders of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international negotiating team, a joint statement was issued that stressed the following:

[Begin Croatian Presidential Spokeswoman Natasa Rajakovic recording, identified by caption] At the joint meeting, the Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kresimir Zubak, the president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, have agreed on the following principles:

They confirm their support for the U.S. peace initiative and the Contact Group plan;

reiterate their firm support for the Washington Agreement, the Federation Constitution and, later on, all agreements aimed at consolidating the Federation and its relations with the Republic of Croatia;

agree that representatives of the Croatian and Bosniak nations embark upon the process of integration of the functions of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina without delay;

confirm once more their firm support for the Split Accord and state that the strategic cooperation will continue with the aim of making a stronger contribution to the peace process, the preservation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the organization of territorial and administrative relations in the liberated areas;

agree that political solutions for the liberated areas be determined later through a political dialogue in line with the Washington Agreement and Geneva principles, regardless of the identity of the army of liberation;

emphasize once more their approval for the presence and work of international humanitarian organizations;

agree that all refugees and displaced people have the right to return to their homes;

welcome and support future, exceptionally important work of the arbiter;

agree to resolve issues regarding the future deployment and activities of the Rapid Reaction Force, RRF, in their mission around Sarajevo. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Tudjman: Eastern Slavonia Problem Must Be Solved

LD1909104695 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman has received in the presidential palace British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Malcolm Rifkind. After the talks Rifkind said that relations between the two countries were satisfactory.

Croatian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mate Granic welcomed a statement made by his British counterpart regarding the improvement of bilateral relations. Minister Granic added that President Tudjman stressed that it is important for Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to accept the resolution of the problem of Baranja, eastern Slavonia, and western Srem in the framework of a global peace solution of the crisis in the region.

Croatian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Mate Granic today received UK Secretary of State Mr. Malcolm Rifkind. Talks between the two ministers were also attended by British Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia Mr. Gavin Hewitt, officials at the British Foreign Office Pauline-Evin Jones, Alan Carlton, and others. On the Croatian side the talks were attended by Deputy Foreign Minister Ivo Sanader, Croatian Ambassador to the United Kingdom Ante Cicin-Sain, special envoy of the president of the republic Ambassador Miomir Zuzul, and other officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The two foreign ministers and their aides held talks about the course and further progress of the peace process for reaching a global solution and establishing peace and security in the region in line with the U.S. peace initiative.

Minister Granic told the guests about Croatia's position, particularly stressing that permanent peace and stability can be achieved only if a peace agreement is comprehensive and if the principles of the internal setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina include speedy peaceful reintegration of occupied eastern parts of the Republic of Croatia.

It was said in the talks that Croatia believes it is necessary for all countries in the area of former Yugoslavia to recognize each other for a comprehensive peace agreement to be achieved which should be implemented through the efforts of the forces of the international community. The Croatian delegation stressed Croatia's interest in speedy inclusion in European processes of integration and further improvement of relations between Great Britain and Croatia.

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Granic: 'Right Time To Bring the War to an End'

LD1909162795 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, has received British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. Also taking part in the talks were Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister. After the talks in the Presidential Palace, the two ministers made statements for journalists. Here is a report by Drazen Korda.

[Korda] Minister Rifkind expressed satisfaction at the advancement of bilateral relations. [passage omitted]

Minister Granic assessed that after the successes scored by the Croatian-Bosniak forces in northwestern Bosnia, a new reality had emerged, and for the sake of the peace process the offensive was halted.

[Begin Granic recording] We believe that it is now the right time to bring the war to an end and achieve a final and just peace. We discussed the rapid reintegration of eastern Slavonia and western Srem and Baranja, and in particular, President Tudjman underscored the importance of the influence of the international community on Milosevic to persuade him to accept an overall peace package. This will mean the mutual recognition of all the states—something that will allow the rapid reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem. [end recording]

[Korda] Minister Granic welcomed the statement by Minister Rifkind and called for an improvement in relations.

Russia's Ivanov Says Time for Peace in Bosnia

LD2009122495 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The time is now right to establish peace in Bosnia through the efforts of the Contact Group, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said to correspondents on his arrival in Croatia. Hrvoje Sarinic, head of the president's office, welcomed Ivanov at Zagreb Airport and held brief talks with him. Drazen Korda reports.

[Korda] In addition to his meeting with Hrvoje Sarinic, Ivanov also had a brief meeting with Bosnian President Izetbegovic, who he is expected to meet again in Sarajevo. Ivanov told the press that he is in Zagreb arrived to discuss a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of a joint effort by the Russian Federation and the Contact Group. The constitutional set up and the cessation of hostilities were discussed and we also mentioned the problem of Eastern Slavonia, he said, and added:

[Begin recording] [Ivanov in Russian with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] Our impression is that this is a very suitable moment for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and the fact that we can establish peace in Bosnia through our efforts. [end recording]

[Korda] Russia is of the opinion that it is now of paramount importance to establish a cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia. Igor Ivanov will hold talks with Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister Ivo Sanader, and he will also be received by President Tudjman.

Russian Ambassador Urges Peace in Srem-Baranya

LD1909203495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2005 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Erdut, Sept. 19 (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina's sector east (Srem-Baranya region) is a powder keg whose going up in flames might touch off a chain reaction, Russian Ambassador in Zagreb Leonid Kerestedzhiyants said in the region's town of Erdut on Tuesday.

A peaceful settlement will therefore have to be found for sector east, Kerestedzhiyants told reporters in a brief statement made after meeting with a delegation of the council of the Srem-Baranya region, headed by Serb Krajina assistant defence minister Milan Milanovic.

The Srem-Baranya region is the only part of the Republic of Serb Krajina that has been spared Croatian invasion.

Direct contacts between the Serb and Croatian sides are necessary if a peaceful settlement is to be achieved, the Russian ambassador said and added that Russia would do everything for the welfare of the local population who had suffered enough.

Commenting on U.S. Ambassador in Zagreb Peter Galbraith's statement that the Serb side should agree that the Srem-Baranya problem be dealt with under the Z-4 plan, Kerestedzhiyants said that the plan was still on the table and any side could draw upon it.

Serb negotiator Milovanovic said, however, that the meeting with Kerestedzhiyants had largely been spent in discussing the Serb proposal that the Srem-Baranya region be given the status of a U.N.-protected area.

He added that the meeting had been held in preparation for a direct Serb-Croatian dialogue.

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Peaceful Reintegration of Eastern Slavonia Rejected

AU1909132195 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Sep 95 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Peaceful Reintegration of Eastern Slavonia Into Croatia—Impossible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac—During the last round of talks with Thorvald Stoltenberg and British diplomat [ambassador to Croatia] Hewitt, our side categorically rejected the possibility of the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem into Croatia. We have urged the establishment of peace in the area, which would last from three to five years, after which the people would decide in a referendum on the status of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem. Any peaceful reintegration of the region into Croatia is impossible because it would surely lead to war, Goran Hadzic told Radio Kragujevac yesterday. The studio announcer introduced him as the chairman of the coordination committee for eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem.

Commenting on the recent formation of the council of the Baranja-Srijem region under Slavko Dokmanovic, head of the Vukovar municipality, Hadzic said that this was a mistake because, according to him, the council stresses that the Baranja-Srijem region has always been a part of Serbia, which implicitly rejects western Slavonia and other parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina.

We have insisted on our statehood not because Baranja and Srijem were once parts of Serbia, but rather because all of us together, the entire Republic of Serb Krajina, was part of the former Yugoslavia.

Emergency Procedure To Expedite Election Law

LD1809181795 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The first day of work at the 28th session of the Chamber of Deputies passed with the emphasis on question time and harmonization of the agenda. Deputies gave their vote of confidence to government Minister Davor Stern and Zlatko Matesa, the newly appointed minister of economics [name and title as received], at the session. Here is a report by Jasenka Dudic:

[Dudic] After several hours of debate the Chamber of Deputies agreed on a 24-point agenda, including 14 draft laws to be considered in an emergency procedure and seven that will receive a second reading.

In another development, the opposition sharply protested the fact that the package of electoral laws will also go through the emergency procedure. The protest was prompted by, among others, the fact that deputies did not receive draft election propositions before the session, but found them on their benches as the session started. The HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] Club of Deputies, however, approved the emergency procedure, Vladimir Seks said, and went on to stress that elections were necessary because of the fact that Operation Storm had changed the political and demographic situation. It was decided by majority vote to allow the election laws to go through emergency procedure. [passage omitted]

Commentary Doubts Western Course of Democracy

AU1909125595 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 14 Sep 95 p 8

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov Colic: "Land of Party Clerks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three months from now will the Croatian National Assembly's Chamber of Representatives look like the parliaments of former Bulgaria, Poland, or Eastern Germany from those notorious oppressive times, or will the new election rules legally confirm a western European development in the Croatian multiparty system, as is being promised in the name of the Government by Deputy Prime Minister Bosiljko Misetic, who—if nothing else—at least has abundant personal experience in jumping from seat to seat on the Croatian party carousel? Because under communism and within the embrace of the Warsaw Treaty, too, besides 268 communists in Bulgarian Parliament, there were also 100 members of the "Bulgarian Agrarian Union" in the role of some kind of "red HSS [Croatian Peasants Party]" (according to the data from 1976), there were 113 members of the Peasants Party, and 37 members of the Democratic Party in the Polish Sejm, while in Honecker's "Volkskammer," apart from the members of four nonsocialist parties, there were also 66 members of the Eastern German "Christian Democratic Union" (CDU), who were even directly elected (data from 1986).

Caligula's Decision

Of course, the majority of those "other parties" represented a mere democratic ornament that obediently fitted into state-forming communism, but in those countries and at those times, at least formally, one could speak of the multiparty system, although not—and definitely not—about democracy. Even within its own block, it was suitable for Moscow to benignly support some kind of western European forms, but essentially this was undeniably a despotic and untouchable ideological and state resolve. Even when someone else was raising his hand, it was known who was in charge and who was the only one with a right to be in charge, so that a mere

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multiparty system does not itself determine the final and actual range of democratic freedoms achieved. This is in addition to the real nature of parliamentarism in Croatia, which has a number of times been described by the notorious, written-off, dismembered, and impotent opposition as a barely disguised substitute to the one-party system.

Now such complaints will be even more resounding: The framework of the new election rules of the game, which have been awaited with anxiety and overt impatience (and long before the turning point of "Operation Storm," many had at least 10 times announced the unofficial beginning of the election campaign), do not allow any essential democratic innovation, but above all build high walls around the sacred gathering place that simultaneously serves as a shield and a sword to the ever more powerful President. And not only are there walls against the opposition, who are patted on the back only when they want to save their skins, dressed as despicable defectors, but also against those loyal, orthodox and unwavering members of the party in power, since only one in five future representatives will be able to claim proudly that he has been elected on his merits, knowledge, personal recognition, persuasiveness, and ability. Through this the party in power is doing everything in advance to provide an absolute majority, and to avoid some new Mesics and Manolics [faction of Croatian Democratic Community that has formed the Croatian Independent Democrats], since three-quarters of representatives are elected by autocratic party principle, more or less the one that can be metaphorically compared with Caligula's decision to appoint a horse—as consul.

Caricature of Crippled Multiparty System

Thus, Croatia is marked as a country of party clerks, who should, as painlessly as possible, be distributed into as small a number of parties as possible, in a situation when both the winners and the losers are foredoomed to reducing all differences, whether regional, ethnic, cultural, or in world view, to the average: As it seems now, the statistics thresholds that have now been raised (5 percent for an independent party, 8 percent for a coalition of two, and 11 percent for a coalition of more parties), except for those who rule, will favor only those who wave the flags of the national center directed to the right, so that the future Parliament—although it is hardly possible to imagine it—will be even more boring, more dogmatic, more gray, and less important, than the present one, which has to vote on its own death sentence in the coming days. Such "democratic stability" pointed out constantly as an outstanding Croatian quality by President Tudjman, is favorable to the executive authority, but on its own—as the bankruptcy of lawfulness in the recently liberated territories has proved—grants neither good, nor capable, nor honest authority, but only that which—in democracy, too—is almost impossible to put out of office by democratic means.

Naturally, he who pays the piper calls the tune, and in a country that is condemned to Croatian temptations, there is no better success than that of a military campaign. A proportional system forms part of a general democratic arsenal, and the opposition will be listened to and followed only if it knows it is able to speak and operate differently. But, besides all those undeniable truths, there is still an unmistakable feeling that the party in power is dreaming of that kind of suicidal stability that the so-called socialist parliaments, too, had tried to achieve in those heavily masked times simply through a grimacing caricature of crippled multiparty systems.

HDZ's 'Operation Marjan' Against Opposition

95BA0360A Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian 28 Aug 95 pp 8-9

[Article by Petar Doric: "Specialists of the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Community) Liberate Split!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Having accepted the order of the supreme commander of the HDZ forces, according to which it is "more important to enter Split than Knin," specialists for overcoming the resistance of enemy parties—Ivan Milas and Ivo Sanader, with the assistance of Jura Radic and Gojko Susak—carried out "Operation Marjan" and, in an irresistible attack, threw the adversary's opposition Union (the HSLS [Croatian Social-Liberal Party], HNS [Croatian National Party], HSP [Croatian Rights Party], SDP [Party of Democratic Reform], HSS [Croatian Peasants Party], and DA [Dalmatian Action]) out of a ruling position in Split, firing a volley of membership cards of the HDZ and other battle privileges on city councilmen Damir Bekavac, Luka Podrug, Branko Grgic, Ivica Leskura, and Slobodan Bocin. And from the force of the blow, the mayor himself, Nikola Grabic, heroically placed his vote for the HDZ.*

That which has been quietly announced for some time, and was expected with a high dose of probability, finally happened. The HDZ again became the ruling party in Split. With an apparently impossible political maneuver, the HDZ obtained the majority in the City Council of Split; this means that, after two years of ruling the second largest city in Croatia, the (in)sufficiently united Union of the HSLS, the HNS, and the HSS will again have to become the opposition. The HDZ leadership claims that the abnormal situation is over whereby the most nationalist Croatian party governs the Split-Dalmatian county while in its major center it had to

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wait helplessly for crumbs of political power. President Tudjman has not been able to endure the lack of election success of the HDZ in the city of Split. Neither Rijeka nor Osijek, in the hands of the liberals, the SDP, or the like, has nearly the importance of the administration of Split. Therefore, the approach of new elections, announced for the end of November, should have brought to an end the long and painstakingly prepared "Marjan" operation, and completely defeated the slow, sluggish, and, in political machinations, unskilled, now already the former ruling Split Union.

Plan for Enticing the Councilmen

Back in July emissaries of the Split HDZ almost publicly and openly circumvented the city councilmen and listed individual wishes of how a transfer from the HSLS, the HNS, and other parties that have representatives in the Split City Council could be most effectively carried out. Therefore, it was not surprising that Franjo Tudjman decided to place Ivan Milas at the head of the Split HDZ leaders for the elections, both the internal party ones and the galloping parliamentary ones, include Jura Radic and Gojko Susak as auditors, and entrust the organizational-technical part of the work to Iva Sanader, as chief negotiator in an operation of enticing, bribing, and recruiting city councilmen. Dr. Tudjman simply did not believe Split officials who lost the last elections, like Marko Bitanga, Jurje Buzolic, and Andjelko Gabric. Their capabilities, it was claimed in Zagreb, had been shown, and the HDZ had to become the opposition.

Therefore, all resources were expended in dismantling the Union and occupying positions in power. Moreover, people close to the president claim that, at the beginning of July, he expressed the most important task of the HDZ with these words: "It's more important to get into Split, than into Knin!" Dr. Tudjman gave only one important instruction to Dr. Sanader—it was necessary to see to it that people who would switch to the HDZ this time be natives of Split by birth, and that they have the best possible reputation among the local populace. And the "arguments" for switching to the HDZ, knowledgeable sources claim, were quite convincing this time: provisions for new apartments, open accounts, and fairly substantial monetary sums in the case of a transfer, service in diplomacy, the offer of rather large credits with a repayment period of 20 years and laughable conditions. Dr. Sanader carried out his task very well, with the really extraordinary assistance of Marko Bekavac, member of the District Authorities, responsible for the work of inspection services. That no one regretted the money is confirmed by the fact that the financial brain of the "Marjan" operation was Dr. Frane Mitrovic, deputy director of the Economic Bank, although, knowledgeable sources also claim, money and credits of the Split Bank were brandished.

Blow to the Main Armchair

How was the blow to the Authorities and the City Council of Split carried out? The most important man in the whole operation was certainly the mayor of Split, Mr. Nikoa Grabic. Only when the HDZ was completely certain that it had assured its "favor" and received guarantees that Grabic, who, on account of the "armchair," had already distanced himself for some time from his mother party, the HSLS, would work from within on the eating away of the Union, did the convincing and offering of everything that could be offered begin. Up to the great turnaround the relation of forces in the City Council was as follows: the Union had 13 places (the HSLS 7, the HNS 5, and the HSS 1); the HDZ, 9; the HSP, 1; the SDP, 1 (after the death of Danimir Matosic, that place was assumed by Dr. Ivo Simunovic, now independent, although he supports the Union); the DA, 1; and independent, 1 (before the DA). This means that the HDZ, which provided the vote of the Union mayor, lacked an actual majority in the Council by five places.

The first to yield before the assault of offers from Dr. Sander, as expected, was the Union Councilman Damir Bekavac (HSLS). The well-known Split lawyer, even deputy mayor right after the last elections, changed "dress" without much opposition, because, evil tongues claim, Bekavac has severe financial difficulties. Next to join the HDZ, the ruling party claimed, was Luka Podrug, distinguished member of the HSP, activist of the SIS [Security and Intelligence Service], once a lawyer in the service of retirement and invalid insurance, once a member of Veselica's HDS, a real increase in strength for the HDZ since Podrug is known as a fiery, sharp speaker who "grinds up" opponents. Councilmen of the HNS also followed in order. It was allegedly easy to convince them, because, in addition to financial motives, apartments, and the diplomatic service, there was also an additional reason, it was claimed: disagreement with the president of the HNS, Radimir Cacic. Judging from everything, two councilmen of the HNS, Branko Grgic and Ivica Leskur, became councilmen of the HDZ. The HDZ is holding in reserve still another HNS councilman, Stanko Milun. His transfer to the HDZ at this time is not necessary, so there will be no hurry with the official announcement of this transfer. The HNS is not prepared to confirm such a possibility, or to deny it. Who is the HDZ's fifth man then?

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What Will the "Hawks" Say?

No, it's not Nikola Grabic. His formal entry into the HDZ is not even necessary. Several days ago Grabic was at president Tudjman's, where it was decided that Grabic would continue to be mayor, of course, with the support of the HDZ, now in the majority. It is believed that Grabic will freeze his tired membership in the HSLS, on the pretext that the Union in the City Council no longer functions anyway. The HDZ particularly figured that Grabic's remaining mayor even without a formal change in party would be a greater blow for the HSLS and the Union than his arrival and some higher duty in the Split branch. The people do not like "deserters," but the question is whether the "hawks" of the Split HDZ would be placated with such an outcome.

Therefore, the fifth man is Slobodan Bocina, member of the DA. Perhaps this is the HDZ's greatest gain, not so much because of Bocina's extraordinary abilities but because of the blow to the DA, which, although not very strong, or important, let alone at the level of its proclaimed principles, enjoys, nevertheless, popularity with and the sympathy of a part of the Split population. The HDZ has needed this switch for years—one of the strong men of the DA, moreover a Croatian soldier from the first day, of which the "regionals" have been proud, he became an HDZ councilman in the strongest opposition city center.

The HDZ will go before the public with the results of these activities very quickly. Perhaps still another switch will surprise us, like that of Vedran Sesartic (independent), who obtained the concession several days ago for the broadcast "City Radio-Net 24." Supposedly Sesartic, a man without a conscious political identity, resisted the first wave of inducements and offers. What if he erred? Will he remain without a concession?

Peronja Leaves His Position

Panic has only now overcome the leadership of the Union. Although all negotiations have been a "public secret," the Union, slow and ineffective as it is, has long been captivated by its resistance and high moral principles. The centers of neither the HSLS nor the HNS in Zagreb have acted. Budisa and Cacic have believed that there was time for talks, that the HDZ action would not bring about results. Even at this moment the Union does not know for sure who, among its councilmen, has signed an application for the HDZ and thinks that everything is not lost yet.

They have forgotten one thing: the Split HDZ had to await with very concrete results the festive arrival of Dr. Tudjman by train from Knin to Split. The preelection campaign opened with the Saturday meeting and ceremony, and it was the assumption of the city administration and authority in the Dalmatian capital that this was the nicest present that the members of the Split HDZ can hand to Franjo Tudjman on the occasion of his victorious arrival "by train in the city by Mt. Marjan [Split]." The trouble lies only in the fact that some older residents of Split remember that some Austro-Hungarian rulers arrived that way, and, by God, so did some Serbian kings! Therefore, even the late arrivals of Drazen Budisa and Radimir Cacic in Split will not change anything. Of 26 positions in the City Council, the HDZ has a sure 14 and if necessary 16. With the full favor of the mayor. Nightmares are again waking us up—pardon, dawn is breaking! The Union hasn't done anything for this city anyway in the past two years. Only one new detai! is confusing: if the HDZ has finally grabbed power in Split, and thus brought into complete agreement the authorities in the District and the city, why must the Split-Dalmatian delegate Kruno Peronja leave his duties? And because of a decision at the top of his own party! It will be known very soon for whom the position of delegate is being held.

[Box, p 8]

Velimir Terzic, Assembly Representative of the HSLS: This Is Sicily!

This is an attack on the political life in all of Croatia, and not only in Split. At the moment of the forceful international propaganda attack on Croatia, the elite Ministry of Foreign Affairs is going its own way in order for its part in Split to buy city councilmen. Loans have been offered that those involved will pay off through guaranteed honoraria of the administrative councils of Split enterprises, and I know reliably that an apartment has been assigned too. The president of the ruling party, acting thereby as president of the state as well, has "cultivated" Mayor Nikola Grabic. So, on the one hand, the esteemed Ministry, in which some would lose their jobs if they hadn't performed this dirty work well, and, on the other, the president of the party and the state. Therefore, the transitions will be paid with the sweat and the callouses of the officials of those Split enterprises in whose administrative councils the newly stamped councilmen of the HDZ are now taking their seats, in order to pay off their newly obtained loans. This kind of thing has been possible up to now only in Sicily, but here, it is obvious that Croatia is going into Europe, from now on, right through Sicily. It is sad that, after numerous hygienic and esthetic improvements, this type of political pollution has occurred in Split.

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[Box, p 9]

Ivica Skaric, President of the Split Section of the HSLS: Dirty Money!

The HDZ has succeeded, for dirty money, in transferring local power in Split to itself. They couldn't do it by legal means, and they couldn't win at the elections, but they have won in another way. We must somehow explain ourselves to our voters, who placed their trust in us, but it has now been lost. In any case, this is a historical step backwards, because it is obvious how any pluralism bothers any party in power. The opposition is the usual decoration here. This is indeed a one-party political system, the same as in that former Yugoslavia.

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3d Presidential Candidate Applies for Registration

LD1909190595 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 19 Sept 95

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish]

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Electoral Commission [PKW] has received an application for the registration of the candidacy of Kazimierz Piotrowicz in the presidential election. Kazimierz Piotrowicz is a mechanic from Chrzanow and a producer of special orthopedic inserts. He is the third candidate to have presented the PKW with an application for registration together with the required number of signatures of support. This was done before him by Lech Walesa and Janusz Korwin-Mikke.

SLD Leader on Campaign, Coalition

WS1909122595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 15 Sep 95 p 3

[Interview with Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and presidential candidate, by Eliza Olczyk; place and date not given: "I Do Not Suffer From Amnesia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Olczyk] For some time, various political groupings and people have been reminding you about your biography, primarily the career you made in the power apparatus of the old system. You countered the letter of the bishops, who appealed to society not to vote for people who had power in the old regime, by saying that this has nothing to do with you. Why do you think the PRL [Polish People's Republic] has nothing to do with you?

[Kwasniewski] All of us have something to do with the PRL—I, the primate, and all of the people who entered maturity before 1989. I said that the bishops' letter had nothing to do with me because I wanted to emphasize the fact that I never made any decision that plunged our country into poverty and indebtedness. After all, the bishops said not to elect as president the people responsible for this. Another reason this letter does not affect me is the fact that it talks about support for the candidates, and the bishops do not support me. So, I jokingly made that statement concerning this specific letter.

If someone wants to hold me responsible for 45 years of the PRL, with me being 40 years old, I think it is as absurd as condemning parents for the behavior of their grown-up children. Some relationship does exist, but there can be no responsibility. The PRL is a closed page, and there is no returning to it—to the state that curtailed the freedom of citizens and had censorship, centralism, a rigid economy, and so forth. All of that is gone.

Each one of us has to answer for his deeds. This also applies to me. I believe, however, that I have no reason to be ashamed of my political activities. They are a source of satisfaction to me. I get the biggest satisfaction out of staying in touch with people with whom I used to work. We talk about what we did and did not achieve. But this conversation is held in an atmosphere of accomplishment.

I do not distance myself from the PRL or look without criticism on the past. Nor did I fall sick with amnesia. But I am sure that the main decisions in Poland should concern something that will come in the future.

[Olczyk] You say that everything is gone. But the lives of many people who were not PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] members, your peers among them, have been destroyed by the old system. Are they supposed to forget everything?

[Kwasniewski] Those who were in jail and were not allowed to go abroad or work because of their profession have every right to lay their claims to the past system. They paid a dear price. The vast majority of the population lived and worked in a state with limited sovereignty. This situation should not be blamed on several or even a dozen people. It was the result of the entire geopolitical arrangement that took shape after the war. Deliberations about whether everything could have been different are merely academic discussions. Some may say that this is a wasted period because Poland could have become an EU member by now. Others will contend that Poland might not have existed after the war. It could have been taken over by Germany or the Soviet Union—something that befell several states in this region. What happened happened. It is hard to draw conclusions by challenging historical facts.

Let me repeat once again that I am not running away from the past. On the other hand, I cannot accept statements that I am the one who is responsible for everything that happened.

[Olczyk] What do you think about the initiative dubbed "Three-Fourths?"

[Kwasniewski] I believe that people who came up with this initiative are conducting, even if pretty flimsily, a negative campaign. I am only surprised that it was backed by several people from the Freedom Union—a party that has repeatedly spoken about its culture, political style, and actions that should not be used.

[Olczyk] Did you ever think about why all of the candidates are attacking only you?

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[Kwasniewski] Because I lead in the polls and stand a chance of winning this election. If I were a candidate with 5-percent support, no one would ever spend money printing posters discouraging people from voting for me. If there is a leading candidate, they are out to destroy him. This does not surprise me at all.

There is a more important problem. These elections will take place eventually. Various kinds of agreements will have to be sought in the second round. Candidates who imagine I may give them my support if I fail to make it to the second round should keep certain doors open.

Besides, I think that the campaign's style will be significant for the future president. It is important not to take negative actions now and then find out later that no normal cooperation is possible. The president should be the president of the entire society. In this context, it would be better for public life in Poland to keep the campaign from going beyond a certain critical point—so that some statements do not produce the situation in which only more door-slamming is possible, with no chance for normal and substantial dialogue.

[Olczyk] You say that you want to be an impartial president instead of the president of just one political wing. Until now, however, you have displayed strong loyalty toward people from the old power system. Let me just recall the case of Ireneusz Sekula [former head of the Main Customs Office] or the vote against expiration of crimes that were not investigated for political considerations. Where is your impartiality in this situation?

[Kwasniewski] Impartiality is not about being without a political base because this base determines the president's efficiency. I do not conceal that this political base is the SLD, while, after the elections, it will be, I hope, the present coalition. This would allow me, as the president, to efficiently implement my proposals until the end of this parliament's term, starting with the adoption of a new constitution, which can be created thanks to the president's approval and support of society.

In my opinion, impartiality means seeing things in a broader perspective than the context of one group or another. The president should act in the spheres that require social consensus, such as foreign policy, state security, and defense. Political support of different groupings can be secured for these spheres.

[Olczyk] No accord between the SLD and other groupings, except for the PSL [Polish Peasant Party], has been possible until now.

[Kwasniewski] The accord with the PSL should not be played down because this party, together with the SLD, forms the legislative majority. I believe, however, that if we were to debate the admission to the EU or NATO, this consensus would go beyond the coalition.

[Olczyk] And would this consensus be realistic even if you are elected president and Jozef Oleksy prime minister?

[Kwasniewski] If I become president, this would happen not as a result of coincidence or a drawing but because the majority of Poles made such a decision. Let the losers draw conclusions. One of them should be: You have to act for the benefit of issues that are more important than the question of whether we like the president. If I lose the elections, I will cooperate with the president on issues on which he and I see eye to eye. I will not go public with my defeat or frustration. I think there is more to life than just these elections. I hope that Poland will see not only its second presidential election but also its 22d.

[Olczyk] Many politicians fear concentration of all power within the SLD, which, after your victory, would be wielded by the prime minister, the president, and the legislative majority. The opposition is weak as it is. If you win, it would be even weaker.

[Kwasniewski] This is true, but this would be because people wanted it that way. Other politicians, too, seek to seize full power. On the one hand, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz speaks about hegemony of the SLD, while, on the other, she wants this parliament dissolved. She wants to disband parliament not to strengthen the SLD but to let the right wing into it, to form a government with the right wing and the PSL, and, subsequently—let me use her words—to install their hegemony. In short, Ms. Gronkiewicz wants to topple the current arrangement, and I can understand that. If she talked with me that way, I would say that I perfectly agree and that I would do exactly the same thing. But please do not talk about any hegemony.

After all, I think that talking about hegemony is a big exaggeration. The president has limited power. The government is formed by the coalition, and no coalition is easy. In addition, we have extremely diversified local self-governments, which will have increasingly more power. There are various trade union structures, economic organizations, the central bank chairman, and the independent civil rights spokesman. We also have state television, whose management is not rightist, and independent newspapers with different orientations. There can be no talk about hegemony. There is only the possibility of influencing certain decisions, primarily those concerning legislative initiatives.

[Olczyk] Those decisions create our present-day reality.

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[Kwasniewski] Thanks to this, however, you can efficiently resolve many issues with one formation being held responsible for them. If in two years, when the next parliamentary elections are held, those in power complain that they could not carry out the social or health insurance reforms, it will mean that they missed their chance. It is easy to predict what the electorate will think about it. Presidential performance can be verified, too. Every once in a while, you have to stand in front of the people and say what you have and have not done.

In my opinion, the arrangement allowing for concentration of power in the hands of the SLD poses a great risk for us in the first place. The only reason I am ready to assume so great a responsibility is that I trust that this can be done better, and I believe in it.

[Olczyk] During meetings with the electorate, you criticize the Catholic Church. One year ago, when the constitution issue was debated, you wanted to persuade your party that a compromise with the church was necessary. Can you use one type of rhetoric on the constitution issue and a completely different one for the presidential campaign?

[Kwasniewski] I have not changed my opinion concerning the compromise with the church. I still think it is necessary. I believe that a religious conflict is the worst thing that can happen in Poland. It would be an unforgivable waste of time. In addition, such a conflict would threaten to divide society. Compromise is made by one of two sides. The church challenged even what was proposed in the new constitution, and these were not unacceptable regulations. So, it is the church that does not want compromise. After all, I do not send out letters or use phrases like "political gangs." Inasmuch as such phrases are used by people whom I appreciate and consider moderate, I believe that we are dealing here with the condition of fear or hopelessness because that is how people in such conditions react, sometimes even slamming the door shut to dialogue, which should be conducted anyway.

Frankly, my willingness to explain the purpose of compromise with the church has dramatically flagged in recent months. It looks like those who said: Do not trust, it is no use, there will be no understanding or any friendly gestures on the part of the church—were right. Nevertheless, I retain my opinion that compromise is possible and necessary, except that it requires that you have a partnership attitude and take no offense. Also, there is no need to heat up electoral passions.

[Olczyk] By criticizing the church on the eve of the legislative elections, you also stirred up passions.

[Kwasniewski] That was not stirring up passions but stressing the differences in our convictions, which we do not hide. These are not only the SLD's convictions. This is a stance held by a significant part of society that differs from the position of the church on the abortion issue, the Concordat, and constitutional regulations. I support what was written in the draft constitution—neutrality on the part of the state, freedom of religion and for other churches, and cooperation between those institutions where it can benefit society. The state should treat everyone equally, regardless of his creed. An individual has freedom of choice. As for faith and the practicing of it, the churches have all freedom. These are fundamentals. What else can be done?

[Olczyk] You will oppose [PLS Chairman] Waldemar Pawlak in this campaign. You will present your program and he will present his. Do you think the differences in the programs may expose weaknesses of the government?

[Kwasniewski] Not necessarily. Differences in the SLD and PSL programs are no surprise. Besides, we target different voters.

Waldemar Pawlak will surely address his program to rural communities. Undoubtedly, certain problems are more acute there. Transformations in the economy are much more advanced than in the countryside. In agriculture, we are in for a very complicated process of reconstruction and changing mechanisms supporting agriculture—something that is very reluctantly accepted by rural residents. In addition, there is a problem of competitiveness for Polish products.

I do not envy Chairman Pawlak because I realize that wining over the rural electorate is not an easy task. Any candidate who wants to shore up support in the countryside will undoubtedly have a problem describing the possibility of changes that would not be an excessive burden for the people and could be acceptable for them.

In my opinion, however, Pawlak will not propose easy solutions just to counter the government policies. Nor do I think voters will gladly listen to laying blame for all failures on the present government. I see for myself that people do not distinguish between the Pawlak and Oleksy Cabinets. This government just exists and operates.

[Olczyk] I understand it is a message for Pawlak. Do you think that two government coalition leaders contending for the presidential post is a healthy thing?

[Kwasniewski] In my opinion, it is a normal situation. In the Poland of 1995, there is no tendency to look for nonpartisan candidates. After all, this may never be the case, inasmuch as throughout the world presidential

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candidates are created by party arrangements. I believe that both the PSL and the SLD should have their own candidates, if only because they should be present on the political scene. But the question of campaign style and manner of debate remains, of course, open.

[Olczyk] Are you afraid of an aggressive election campaign?

[Kwasniewski] There are few things I am afraid of because I have been through much already—petards, jeers, other actions. But I think it would be a problem if the campaign concentrated on unimportant and dirty issues. If debates on the past, charges of scandal, and deliberations on who is and who is not a Jew (many candidates have already been called so) prove more important, nothing good will come out of it for us. The campaign style, however, depends on the candidates. There are a great deal of significant issues waiting for discussion. Besides, elections are not a war or a plague. This is why we should behave ourselves and do what is usually done in a democracy: Conduct debates, win or lose, shake hands, and go to work. That is how things should look.

[Olczyk] Do you think the election slogan "Let Us Elect the Future" is good?

[Kwasniewski] I think it is because it emphasizes what lies ahead of us rather than what is in the past.

[Olczyk] Do you think this slogan can convince someone who does not accept your prior background?

[Kwasniewski] Of course not.

[Olczyk] In other words, this slogan is for those already convinced.

[Kwasniewski] Poland is not divided into the convinced and the unconvinced. There are small groups of both, and then the vast majority of those who seek answers for their questions and doubts. Those answers should have merit for them. I do not think they will care about my biography. Democracy, economic development, jobs, prospects for young people, people's security—these are topics for discussion.

[Olczyk] What do you think about the possibility of holding a preconstitutional referendum along with the presidential elections?

[Kwasniewski] There is not enough time to thoroughly prepare it. Besides, with the campaign focusing on essential matters, the presidential elections would be a kind of referendum because people would be able to elect the candidate whose views, including those on the Constitution, most appeal to them. I believe there is a chance for such a debate.

Catholic Church Fears SLD Win in Election

WS2009102495 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 19 Sep 95 p 2

[Interview with Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, secretary of the episcopate, by Cezary Gmyz; place and date not given: "The Church Is Not Taking Part in a Beauty Contest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gmyz] In its "Word on Public Matters," the church discussed the presidential election again; it was actually the second time in a short period of time that the episcopate discussed this issue. Even though it was not stated explicitly, it is clear from the document that the church is afraid of the possibility of Aleksander Kwasniewski's being elected to the highest office of the state.

[Pieronek] If there were no fears, it would have been unnecessary to make another statement on the presidential election. We fear a dramatic situation in which the configuration that was raised in a totalitarian system and that was part of the totalitarian leadership wants to take over power in our country [as published]. What guarantees can we expect from people who had time enough to prove that they have ridded themselves of totalitarian habits but who, it is clear, have not done this? The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] won the election, and its antichurch character played a vital role in this victory. After the election, despite a patient dialogue, it turned out that this enmity toward believers is insurmountable. Thus, what reasons can believers have to vote for these people? I am surprised that this group, which came to power largely due to the inaction of society, has not taken advantage of this moment in time to present itself as a force that respects democracy.

[Gmyz] Are you now talking about the Vatican Concordat?

[Pieronek] It is not only this issue that I am talking about. I am now talking about many draft laws that are being forced in the Sejm, and many problems the government has failed to handle, such as the problem of self-government. I am also talking about the Constitution, which is subordinated to the winner. This is a hollow victory. Democracy can win only if it reckons with the fact that a large portion of society—in this case, a larger portion—thinks otherwise.

[Gmyz] Archbishop Ignacy Tokarczuk stated in a sermon delivered the day before yesterday that it is no use discussing the Concordat with the people who are currently in power. He added, however, that he was not speaking on anyone's behalf. What is the episcopate's opinion on this?

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[Pieronek] There is no situation in which we can say that we will not talk, if the other side also wants dialogue. It should be noted that, even though it has not been ratified yet, the Concordat has already largely carried out its task. One of the charges leveled at us was that we wanted to dominate other religions in Poland. However, as a result of the fact that the Concordat was signed and that discussions on it were held, the Sejm passed laws that regulate issues concerning many other religions. Before that, these issues were not regulated, even though other churches wanted this very much.

[Gmyz] There are opinions that the SLD's victory in the previous election was a reaction to the fact that the church filled an increasingly greater portion of public life. Do you not fear that also this time the outcome may be opposite the intention, that after the Sunday Masses people will vote for Kwasniewski?

[Pieronek] I do not rule out such a possibility, but I do believe in the wisdom of the people. However, it is the church's duty to warn the people against danger, to show ethical principles. Even if the church may consequently lose popularity, we must carry out this duty. If the people want to have one type or another political and economic system, then it is all right with us. We respect this, but it does not mean that we will remain silent. It is actresses and politicians who seek popularity. While engaging in public matters, the church often acts against popularity-gaining rules. We are not a girl who is taking part in a beauty contest.

[Gmyz] If Kwasniewski wins the election, will the church respect the decision of the people?

[Pieronek] Of course it will. The church has often been in situations that were disadvantageous to it. However, it never severed all relations with the authorities. It never stopped demanding what it considered righteous.

[Gmyz] The episcopate prepared a letter on the need for dialogue and tolerance. Does it really make any sense to speak about this now that there is talk about a cold religious war between the church and the left wing?

[Pieronek] Such a letter is needed particularly at such a moment, when emotions are beginning to get out of hand, and not only on one side. Doubts were expressed in the episcopate whether such a letter should be prepared in the present situation. It was decided, however, that such a document is even more indispensable. There are no revelations in the document; it merely confirms the well-known truth that a dialogue is better than disputes.

[Gmyz] Four out of the six issues discussed at the latest conference of the episcopate in Wigry overlapped quite considerably with politics. Does this mean that the church is becoming increasingly interested in public matters?

[Pieronek] I am glad that you have drawn attention to the openness of the episcopate in many directions. This shows quite clearly that the Catholic Church is universal, which means that it is open to all of the problems related to human beings. The episcopate sees the entire context of human life. We cannot restrict the role of churches—I am not talking only about the Catholic Church—to the dimension of some association of canary breeders that deals with only one problem.

[Gmyz] During the conference, you approved the text of a joint statement by Polish and German bishops. Does it contribute any new elements to the process of reconciliation between our nations?

[Pieronek] This statement will certainly contain elements of the past; however, it is primarily an act of opening toward the future. Our future—in the political, social, economic, and cultural sense—is the EU. In the statement, the Polish Episcopate expressed its readiness to join this structure, while the German Episcopate confirmed its support for our integration efforts.

[Gmyz] However, recently the Polish primate criticized our rush toward Europe. What visions of the EU do Polish and German bishops have then?

[Pieronek] The criticism expressed by the primate was justified, in that all of the churches in Europe, not only the Catholic Church, have problems with the EU. As communities of believers, churches express their fears regarding the present situation; they also fear the future.

I believe that the words spoken by the primate cannot be interpreted as a negation of Europe. The primate's sermon was wrongly understood. No one in the church negates our desire to join the EU, but we want a Europe of fatherlands, not a Europe of Brussels bureaucrats. We want a Europe where we can feel comfortable, a Europe where our home would remain our home. In such a Europe, Germans should feel German, with all of the achievements of their tradition involving many religions; Poles should feel Polish and Spanish people should feel Spanish. This Europe should leave enough room for Catholics, Protestants, believers of the orthodox church, and atheists to express their own identity. Life is too complicated to compare it to some slogan that today seems modern and that is being advertised but that, in fact, is just another illusion.

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Solidarity Urges Prevention of Electoral Fraud

LD1909164995 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1600 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The chairman of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union [NSZZ] Solidarity, Marian Krzaklewski, said today that the absence of observers independent of the present authorities might bring about a situation of falsification of the presidential elections. That, too, is why Solidarity has undertaken an action to bring about the wide participation of union members in electoral commissions at all levels.

[Unidentified correspondent] Fraud may come about in various ways, not necessarily through the falsification of documents, but also through influence upon people, said the leader of the trade union. Such an audit is our responsibility, and this year, other than in 1993, we will undertake such actions.

Marian Krzaklewski stressed that the trade union will do everything for there to be a dialogue between the candidates for presidential office of the Independence-Solidarity camp, and he stressed that there are considerable opportunities for this. The avoidance of dialogue will be the fist negative criterion in the evaluation of candidates by the National Congress. Dialogue between Lech Walesa, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Jan Olszewski, and Leszek Moczulski is to bring about not only a decision on someone standing down, for the point is also to decide the tactics for Poland for the coming years.

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NAA Head 'Perplexed' About PRM in Government

AU1909200995 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 15 Sep 95 p 9

[Article by Bogdan Burileanu: "Particular Interest in Political Developments in Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At yesterday's meeting with President Ion Iliescu, Mr. Karsten Voigt [president of the North Atlantic Assembly—NAA] emphasized the particular interest of his organization in the political developments in Romania. Positively assessing the presidential initiative for reconciliation with Hungary, the guest dwelt on the need to solve all disputes between the two countries and said that a future modification of the Maastricht Treaty is possible, to the extent of facilitating the access of new members to NATO, even before they were integrated in the EU. In this respect, Mr. Voigt declared himself perplexed about the presence of a grouping calling itself "Greater Romania" [PRM] not only in the Parliament, but also in the composition of the current government, something which, in the opinion of the West, represents a potential threat to the stability of the current borders. By comparison, he pointed to the concern that the official existence in Germany of a political grouping called "Greater Germany" might cause among certain European states.

Government Approves Army Budget Cuts for 1995

AU2009065895 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 12 Sep 95 p 16

[Article by Doru Dragomir and Radu Tudor: "The Government Has Cut Over 140 Billion Lei From the Army's Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week, governmental decisionmaking factors made a decision that triggered off a huge scandal. With the personal approval of Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, the Ministry of Finance cut off 8 percent of the Ministry of National Defense budget for 1995. From the approximately 1,700 billion lei allocated to the Army this year, more than 140 billion was cut off.

This measure will seriously affect the living standards of the soldiers as well as their food allowances and combat training level. Last, but not least, it will also have a negative impact on the contracts for housing construction and the modernization of the logistics infrastructure of the Romanian military units.

At a recent news conference in Sibiu, Colonel General Dumitru Cioflina, chief of staff of the Romanian Army, said that, by the end of the year, the total number of troops of the Ministry of National Defense will only be 230,000, down from the 271,000 registered in 1991. The difference is made up of 9,000 cadres who were pensioned off and 32,000 fewer conscripts. According to Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca, this reduction is not drastic and was done in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Treaty.

Problems With Legal, Illegal Immigrants

95BA0323A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 14 Jul 95 p 5

[Article by Tudor Mihai under the rubric "Democracy, With Its Good and Bad Points: The World Immigration 'Front' Has Gripped Romania, Too"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *On 28 July 1957 in Geneva, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, convened by the United Nations, adopted the Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees. In 1967, in New York, the Protocol Concerning the Status of Refugees was initialed. Both were supposed to "tidy up" and offer an institutionalized framework to the waves of emigrants heading toward the West. The Convention and the Protocol defined a refugee as a person "who, as a result of well-founded fears of being persecuted due to his race, religion, nationality, or membership in a given social group, or to his political opinions, is located outside the country of which he is a citizen, and who cannot have or, due to these fears, does not wish to have, that country's protection (...) [and] cannot or (...) does not wish to return." Obviously, although this was not directly specified, these two international legal instruments were conceived in the spirit of the Cold War of that time, in order to address the taking in of refugees from the Communist states. For example, it is well known that there was persecution unleashed in Romania—and not just there—against those with political convictions other than communism, and against the Germans and the "kulaks." As was absolutely to be expected for that time, Romania ratified neither the Convention nor the Protocol.*

Like It or Not, We Have To Struggle With a New Phenomenon

Meanwhile, things have changed. The Cold War is over, and Central and East Europe are orienting themselves toward democracy and toward the Western democracies. But, most especially, refugees from other countries have started arriving in our region. It is logical that, due to our geographic position and to the war in the former Yugoslavia, the migration through Romania and the number of illegal residents within our country's territory have far surpassed the quota of "zero" characteristic of the pre-1989 period. Our political opening in general, as well as our declaring null and void the former (communist) law concerning foreigners—a

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law with very tough provisions in this field (compulsory registration of foreigners with the militia [police], declaration of their visit's purpose and of their intended itineraries, etc.) which discouraged attempts by foreigners to enter or stop in Romania—have created a new reality: the confrontation of the Romanian state with a new phenomenon—illegal immigration.

According to estimates by the Directorate General for Passports and Border Police, which comes under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there are 20,000 foreign persons whose sojourn in Romania is illegal. Included in this figure are both persons who entered illegally and persons who entered legally but whose legal right to stay has meanwhile expired.

Our country now has a portion of the legal "tools" with which it can react in the face of this phenomenon: On 4 July 1991, Law No. 46, through which Romania joined the Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees as well as the Protocol Concerning the Status of Refugees, became operative. In 1992 the Romanian Center for Migration Issues was established. But any law which would set up rules governing foreigners has yet to be acted on by Parliament.

It is true that our country is not the immigrants' final goal; they enter Romanian territory merely in order to cross it so that they can reach the West. Whether their attempts "fall through," temporarily or for good, within our borders, or whether the migrants succeed in getting to "the other side," it is clear that illegal immigration is a new "wrinkle" for the Romanian state. Immigrants are coming particularly from Asian countries (Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Iran, Iraq), from Africa (Somalia, Morocco, Guinea), or from Albania.

The "Struggle" at the Border

The greatest share of immigrants acquire their epithet of "illegal" through their fraudulent crossing of the border. They come from Ukraine, Moldova, and Bulgaria. In Kiev, for example, there is a gathering place from which people leave for Poland or Romania.

Those who try to enter the country on false passports count less, because there are fewer of them. In any case, the great majority of forgeries, which are sometimes among the crudest kind, are ferreted out.

But the attempts to avoid official border-crossing points are a much more extensive matter. This procedure is used at both the entry into Romania and at the exit. There are very well-organized international networks which engage in this sort of thing. Here is how things are done: a group organized by one "end of the line" is led across the border, for a fee, by a local guide; there the group is handed over and left in the care of another guide, who in his turn again leads the group across the next border, once again for a fee; and so it goes until the endpoint is reached—if everything goes according to plan.

Sometimes, however, the special forces of the countries being crossed intervene. At other times, between one "fee" and the next "fee," people's money runs out before they have reached their destination—the much-coveted bridgehead called Austria. When that happens, things get complicated. The immigrants become much easier prey for the police who, at least recently, have intensified their raids in search of these immigrants.

Within Romanian borders there are already well-established points where migrants are concentrated and groups are formed. Bucharest and also Oradea, Satu Mare, Arad, and Timisoara are places where the international networks have arranged for immigrants to be put up at people's homes while they are waiting for an auspicious moment to cross the border.

Those who are caught while attempting a fraudulent border crossing are, under Romanian law, subject to 15 days to three months in jail, or a fine of 10,000 to 25,000 thousand lei [L]. The fine is reduced by half if it is paid on the spot. In other words, if you have, let's say, L15,000 in your pocket, you can coolly make three attempts, just so long as one is successful.

The border guards are not allowed to use the arms they are equipped with (which are supplied with enough ammunition to carry on a miniwar) except in limited cases. Should someone escape while under escort, for example, the border guard has to be "fleet of foot," since the escapee has to be captured absolutely without any gunfire. With an escapee who "runs well," we would need to engage only border guards the likes of Carl Lewis or Linford Christie, world-record-holding sprinters...if we want to catch the fugitive before he crosses over to "the other side."

For a guide (who is subject to arrest only if caught in the act), the penalties are somewhat heavier: from six months to three years in prison or, for group "transactions" or for "transactions" involving the acquisition of material benefits, one to five years in prison.

It would be good if those penalties were enforced, but "many times we arrest them and open up criminal records on them, and, a little while later, we meet up with them in the street, they laugh in our faces, and there's nothing we can do to them," charges Colonel Dumitru Mocanu of the National Border Guard Command. It has gotten to the point where foreign citizens have settled in Romania through marriage to a citizen and are engaged in the border-crossing

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"guidance" business. But Col. Mocanu, overlooking all these troubles, or maybe doing just the opposite, does not forget to mention the fact that "Romania is the first and most solid barrier as regards the influx of immigrants heading toward the West."

This quality was recognized only unofficially by the "target" countries of immigration when we asked them to help us stem the tide. "For the time being, all we've gotten is words, 'applause,' and assurances that we are understood," Col. Mocanu told us. But that is all—nothing we could use to counteract the inadequacy of our technical means (of transport, of communication, etc.). And that means that the struggle with the guides, who are well supplied from the technical viewpoint, will continue to offer them loopholes. (These guides have some of the most state-of-the-art long-distance communications equipment and "connections" between the "links" of the networks; furthermore, we know that, during the former Soviet period, an ambassador was involved in such a network.)

How Far Can "Refugee Rights" Be Taken?

The Romanian Institute for Human Rights is, in keeping with its mission, a defender of refugee rights; this is the direction toward which the activities of other nongovernmental organizations active in the same field, organizations which appeared in Romania after 1989, are directed: human rights. A publication (called "Refugees and Their Legal Status"), published under the aegis of this institute, underlines the benefit to migrants and their children who, because of "the impact of being in a milieu which is often superior to the one they left, profit culturally, intellectually, and professionally." And, further on, the same publication stresses that "migration brings benefits also to those who take in the migrants; they bring, certainly, a workforce to the marketplace, manpower which is generally cheaper than native-born manpower—a fact which, as anyone can understand, offers economic benefits." The publication even goes on to say, by extension, "let us not forget the wave of tall, athletic young people, uncommonly successful, which appeared in Germany after the war, under conditions where American occupation forces were stationed there."

But let us return to Romanian soil. Does our country have those economic "windows" through which it can absorb immigrants, even if it is only for work considered the lowest of the low? No way. Nevertheless, we have immigrants. Now, there is a provision in the Geneva Convention according to which refugees are to be granted "the most favorable treatment, under the same circumstances, as the citizens of a foreign country as regards the exercising of a salaried vocational activity." Fortunately, the Convention does not call for treatment which is favorable in comparison with the treatment received by citizens of the host countries. This allows us some distance from the issue of ensuring jobs to others under conditions in which we do not have enough even for "our own." If those others find work, that's good; if not...it is not our concern.

However, it is still a long way before we reach the problem of jobs. The same Convention provides that criminal sanctions will not be imposed on refugees because of their illegal entry into or their sojourn in a country, with the condition that they appear in front of the authorities in order to state the reasons for their actions. This is where time becomes important. This is because the necessary "jumping through hoops" (papers, determination of identity, evaluation of the application to acquire refugee status) takes time—a period long enough for a person to be able to attempt a new frontier crossing in the desired direction.

As of 1 July 1995, according to data provided us by Mr. Coriolan Atanasiu, coordinator of the Technical Secretariat of the Romanian Committee for Migration Issues [CRPM], 2,600 applications for refugee status were submitted to CRPM. Out of those, only one half have been evaluated to date. On a worldwide level, and in Romania likewise, the proportion of applications which are successful is approximately 10 percent. That is because, in most cases, we are dealing with economically motivated refugees. (By way of a miscellaneous news item, let us mention also the application by a...French citizen. It was turned down, since his true motivation was the idea that his attraction for people of the same sex would be better hidden among Romanians.) But this fact does not absolve us from the issues raised by those who desire "brighter horizons." Mr. Atanasiu stated to us that "over the period January '91-January '95, the Government of Romania spent one million dollars on the support of asylum-seekers." We would have been in better shape if we, like Hungary, Turkey, or Malta, had opted for the variant in the Geneva Convention text which allows a country to take in only citizens of European countries.

The above statement could very well be rounded out by that of Col. Ion Vergu of the Directorate General of Passports and Border Police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: "For 1995, we have 5-7 million lei left available." If we were not to receive assistance toward returning immigrants to their countries of origin, assistance provided by international organizations (in this case, the World Organization for Migration) and transport companies, things would become much more complicated. In any case, we need to get beyond the failure to react on the part of some embassies, which

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carp at the distances separating Romania from the "returnables'" native countries.

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Slovene, Croatian Leaders Discuss 'Open Issues'

LD2009094295 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Several minutes ago talks got under way in Maribor between Nikica Valentic and Janez Drnovsek, the Croatian and Slovene prime ministers, respectively. All open issues between the two countries will be discussed, in particular the borders in the Piran Bay and debts owed by the Ljubljanska Banka to Croatian citizens.

The two delegations also include Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and Slovene Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler, and Hrvoje Kacic and Istok Simoniti, Croatian and Slovene chairmen of the mixed border commission, as well as the two countries' respective ambassadors.

After the meeting the two prime ministers will hold a news conference.

Thaler: Separate Talks on Property, Minorities

BR1509110495 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 15 Sep 95 p 5

[Interview with Slovenian Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler by Roberto Morelli in Trieste; date not given: "Slovenians Say: 'Your Exiles? For Us the Issue Does Not Exist'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Morelli] Minister Thaler, what does Slovenia intend doing to reopen negotiations?

[Thaler] To tell you the truth, we are still waiting for a reply from the Italians concerning the date of the next meeting between the two fully empowered mediators (Amedo de Franchis and Ivan Jancar—CORRIERE DELLA SERA editor's note). The new summit should come up with a balanced and constructive reply otherwise it is pointless going on and it would be better to let an international arbiter find a solution. I suggested to [Italian Foreign Minister] Mrs. Agnelli that we could meet here in Trieste but she claimed that it was not the best place for us to talk. Much against our will, Slovenia still has strained relations with your country which tends to look too much to the past, returning to questions that were resolved long ago and which have thus entered into the realm of ideology.

[Morelli] There are two problems: Giving back refugees' houses to them, and the question of the minorities.

[Thaler] These are two very different themes which are hardly comparable. We cannot accept that the status of minorities is linked to a question of property which has already been settled and defined in past agreements. In all, the 100 to 200 houses cannot be as important a subject as the rights of minorities. That was the fundamental mistake made in Aquileia (the Martino-Peterle [former Italian, Slovenian foreign ministers] agreement subsequently denounced by the Slovenian Government—IL CORRIERE DELLA SERRA editor's note]. That is why we are proposing splitting the negotiations into two separate documents that can be examined at the same time, although the minority issue should be given priority. The question of property is certainly not a pressing concern.

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Federal

Holbrooke Comments on Talks With Milosevic

LD1909180995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1723 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 19 September (TANJUG)—On emerging from his brief meeting with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade this afternoon, head of the U.S. negotiating team for the former Yugoslavia Richard Holbrooke said that little but visible progress has been made in the negotiating process. [passage omitted]

"We came here to brief President Milosevic on our meetings with the Croatian and Muslim leaderships," the American negotiator said. "The meeting between Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Zubak continued after we had left Zagreb," he added.

We are investing great efforts to maintain the progress achieved in the talks so far, for which the situation around Sarajevo is of exceptional importance. "We are presently very encouraged with what we have heard about that," Holbrooke said.

After reporting to President Clinton in Washington, "we will be back next week," he said.

However, he declined to respond when asked about the issue of the Muslim-Croat offensive in central and western Bosnia.

Milosevic's Office on Talks

LD1909175695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1716 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Sep (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today again held talks with the American state delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, at the end of its visit to the region.

The talks centered on the latest developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and activities in connection with the successful course of the negotiating process aimed at establishing peace.

It was said that a calming of the escalation of war operations should be expected, in the spirit of the readiness expressed by the parties to the conflict to conclude a final peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian president's office said.

Belgrade: NATO To Influence Croatians, Muslims

LD1909203595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2019 GMT 19 Sep 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept. 19 (TANJUG)—The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia expected NATO to decisively prevail on Croatia and Bosnian Muslims and Croats towards stopping their offensive in Bosnia as it most directly prolonged war and questioned the continuation of the peace process, said Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic Tuesday.

'We would like to believe that NATO would definitively stop the bombings' of Bosnian Serbs 'after the signing of the agreement on withdrawal of heavy weapons from around Sarajevo and especially (after) its implementation,' said Lilic during a talk with a Russian State Duma delegation in Belgrade.

'A military option is impossible. For this reason our country has invested great efforts in political talks, which it believes to be the only way towards peace,' said Lilic.

'There are those who wish persistently to draw the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into war. But, Europe must understand that such a war would spill across the borders not only of our country but the region as a whole,' said Lilic.

Head of the Russian delegation Vladimir Lukin stressed that the Russian parliament's intention was to lend support to peace and Yugoslavia's peace policy, especially in these decisive moments for the resolution of the crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in particular for Bosnia-Herzegovina as the weighs of peace and of war hung in balance.

Lilic assessed that the 'energetic urging of the Russian Federation, the Duma, all the state organs and President Yeltsin for an equal treatment of all the parties to the conflict is of vast importance.'

Yugoslavia expected the 'Russian Federation will be successful in securing the lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia and that it will unilaterally lift them if certain significant factors in the world persist with a policy of pressures,' said Lilic.

Milutinovic, Agnelli on Progress in Peace Process

AU1909191795 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Report by Tatjana Grkovic from Rome]

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic ended a

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one-day working visit to Rome. An invitation by the Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli ensued after the considerable progress that had been achieved in the peace process on former Bosnia-Herzegovina, of whose essence Minister Agnelli was briefed today.

Yugoslavia and Italy have plenty of joint interests. The precondition for their realization is primarily peace in Bosnia. For that reason, Italy's desire to participate fully in the peace process and accelerate it is understandable.

The visit of Minister Milutinovic took place in a moment when Italy chairs the UN Security Council and is a member of the European Union troika, as the next EU chairman after Spain. For that reason, Agnelli was presented with numerous arguments favoring future actions of the Italian diplomacy in international relations. Italy is one of the few countries that excels by its balanced and principled approach to the Bosnian crisis and its steadfast desire to restore peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina as quickly as possible. For that reason, both sides assessed today's talks as positive.

[Begin recording] [Agnelli, in Italian with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] This is the first visit of FRY Foreign Minister Milutinovic to Italy. It represents the continuation of Italy's policy to cooperate with all the countries that have emerged on the territory of the earlier Yugoslavia. We discussed bilateral relations and, naturally, above all, the issues regarding peace. We hail the cease-fire and the chance to be able to discuss the reconstruction of the war-torn territories now.

[Milutinovic, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I would like to thank Madame Minister for these worlds. Today's meeting is a continuation of our more-or-less permanent dialogue with Italy. We are extremely satisfied that Italy championed and still champions a very balanced approach to the problems in the earlier Yugoslavia and the crisis in Bosnia. We are fully aware of Italy's stance and we appreciate it. We hope that Italy will exert its influence in the European Union and NATO to stop the war and facilitate the cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia, so that we would be able to end the NATO bombing. We have reached an agreement about Sarajevo and now we would like the cease-fire to apply to the entire Bosnia. Following this Muslim-Bosnian offensive in western Bosnia, we are now faced with a big problem, the problem of refugees. More than 100,000 people. This is a tragic situation that was not needed. We are close to peace now, however, it seems that somebody does not want it. We hope that Italy will use its influence to help peace be restored as quickly as possible and that a peace conference will be organized as quickly as possible. Also, that we will achieve a true and lasting peace and that all sides in the conflict will be satisfied as much as possible. [end recording]

The meeting of the Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic with Susanna Agnelli started a series of talks that the Yugoslav chief of diplomacy will hold over the next few days, however, in considerably altered circumstances. The international community in reality recognized the existence of the Serb Republic and peace is now closer than ever before.

Serbia

SPO Asks Milosevic To Halt Enemy Offensive

LD1909145195 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1348 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Sep (SRNA)—The Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] today called on Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to address the nation in connection with the situation in western parts of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic.

SPO spokesman Ivan Kovacevic told today's news conference that the party's view is that the Serbian president "must tell the world that Serbia will not allow any further aggression against the Serb Republic."

He concluded that the authorities in Belgrade should urge the contact group members, and specifically the United States and Germany, to use their influence to secure a halt to the Croatian-Muslim aggression and to leave "every occupied inch of the Serb Republic."

"The contact group map proposed last year must be respected, otherwise the Serb army will be forced to regain Glamoc, Drvar, Grahovo, Sipovo, Jajce, and other occupied cities," the SPO spokesman said.

According to SPO deputy Milan Bozic, if the aggression against the Serb Republic continues, Yugoslavia may become involved in the war.

"The possible fall of Banja Luka would involve Yugoslavia in the war in a serious way," Bozic concluded and added:

"We shall know in the next few days whether we shall become involved in the war or not."

Seselj To Hold Anti-Milosevic Rally on 21 Sep

LD1909144695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1348 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Sep (SRNA)—Serbian Radical Party Chairman Vojislav Seselj said at a news conference today that "the big powers ought to be told that the Serbian people cannot accept the occupation of the Serb Republic."

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"Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic does not represent Serbia's national interests, or the desires or needs of the Serbian nation, because he is surrendering western Serbian towns through his own people without any fighting", Seselj said.

According to Seselj, the upcoming meeting organized by Seselj's party on Thursday in front of the Federal Assembly represents the beginning of an intensified political struggle which will "save Serbian democracy and Serbian lands."

Seselj said that at this rally, people will express their desire to prevent the further betrayal of Serbian national interests, and he calls on other opposition parties, primarily the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia, to take part in this rally.

Group of 1,261 Krajina Serb Refugees Arrives

LD1909164695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1602 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept. 19 (TANJUG)—A total of 1,261 Krajina Serbs arrived in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia this weekend from the U.N. base in Knin and the camp in Zadar, where they were held following Croatia's August aggression, the Yugoslav Red Cross (YRC) said on Tuesday.

'Refugee lists contain many new names compared to lists earlier supplied by the U.N. Protection Force. The Croatian authorities have detained 35 people accused of alleged war crimes, but 500 additional people have arrived from the camp in Zadar,' said Branko Popovic, the head of the YRC service for finding displaced persons.

Popovic said that among those registered there are 543 men, 612 women and about 100 children younger than 14 years.

Another group of about 30 Krajina Serbs will arrive during the day from Topusko, in northern Serb Krajina, TANJUG learned in the Belgrade office of the U.N. High Commessariat [as received] for Refugees.

The 32 are made up of old people from the towns of Topusko, Dvor, Slunj and Glina, all in the Sector North, who were captured by the Croatian authorities in their own homes because they were too feeble to flee the Croatian aggression on Serb Krajina.

The youngest in this group is 75 years old, and the oldest 85.

Following the Croatian aggression on Aug. 4, about 250,000 Serbs fled Serb Krajina. The majority of them found refuge in Yugoslavia.

Vojvodina Hungarians Receive Threatening Leaflets

AU1909184895 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 19 Sep 95 p 2

[Correspondent's report: "Hungarians Threatened in Zombor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarians and Croats in Zombor found the following leaflet in their mailboxes:

"Hungarians, Croats, and other non-Serb gentlemen!

"As the Croatian ustashas drove the Serb people away from their native land of centuries and carried out a genocide, we demand that you leave the Serb land peacefully!

"If you refuse to do this, we will drive you away by force. Be reasonable! This is in your interest and in the interest of your children, your grandchildren, and the future generations.

"For the King and the Homeland!"

The intimidation of the ethnic Hungarian population continues in Zombor in Vojvodina: Some people again received threatening letters over the weekend, letters that ask them to "move out voluntarily, while they have the possibility to do so peacefully." According to information we received by telephone, these letters were sent to inhabitants of the so-called upper town in Zombor.

Imre Kocsis, district chairman of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMDK), told us that the citizens who found these threatening letters in their mailbox came to him. "Although they already tried to exercise pressure on us with other methods, this letter surprised the people because they did not think such a thing might actually happen. Some people are seriously alarmed, but, in spite of the threats, no one wants to leave his homeland," Imre Kocsis told us. He also informed us about the method in which five to six armed men surround a house in the villages inhabited by Hungarians mainly in the area of Zombor and try to convince the owners to hand over their house.

The chairman of the other organization of ethnic Hungarians, the Association of Hungarians in Vojvodina, was in Orszallas near Zombor on Sunday [17 September] and met with district official Mile Djapic. Ferenc Csubela told us that Mile Djapic was aware of the threats against Hungarians and Croats and promised to investigate the matter. He said they would deal with these cases the same way as with the previous forceful occupation of houses, something that the authorities are now avoiding.

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"The Serb extremists are quite active in Zombor and its surroundings, and I personally saw this on the spot. Every evening, they try to frighten the national minorities in the area by going on a shooting spree," Ferenc Csubela told us.

Ferenc Csubela also discussed the refugee issue with the district officials who also recognized that the area can no longer bear this burden. However, the central authorities continue to ignore the issue and, therefore, the commander of the refugee headquarters in Zombor is trying to convince Belgrade to settle the refugees in other parts of Serbia.

According to some ideas, the groups living in the Serb parts of the former Croatia should not be separated and, so, for example, the 140 people living in Orszallas should be directed to one place.

'Speculation' Over Mladic's Whereabouts

AU1909182795 Paris AFP in English 1746 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Sept 19 (AFP)—A week after General Ratko Mladic reportedly checked into a Belgrade hospital for minor gall-bladder surgery, the Bosnian Serb military chief's whereabouts and state of health—physical and political—are unknown.

Speculation in the Serb capital about Mladic, a burly, tough-talking Serb nationalist, has centered on several possibilities, according to independent Belgrade daily NASA BORBA.

One is that Mladic, 51, is genuinely ill, and is convalescing in an undisclosed location. On Sunday, a Russian news agency, quoting the speaker of the Bosnian Serb "parliament," reported that Mladic was hospitalized at the end of last week with urological problems in Belgrade's Military Academy Hospital.

But on Tuesday a staff member in the hospital's urology center told AFP that Mladic was not there.

Similar attempts by Belgrade media to confirm his presence produced conflicting answers.

These confusing circumstances have fueled speculation that Mladic is, in fact, suffering from a "diplomatic illness," rather than or along with a physical one.

Whether, in this scenario, Mladic has voluntarily withdrawn from center stage or has been forced into the shadows by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is being hotly debated in and around Belgrade.

The respected NASA BORBA has even suggested that Mladic could be under "house arrest."

But some observers point out that it serves Mladic well to "disappear" during a period when Bosnian Serbs have suffered sharp military and territorial losses in Bosnia. NATO air raids have punished Serb positions around Sarajevo, while Bosnian government and Croatian forces have wrested at least 4,000 square kilometers (1,600 square miles) of territory from Serb control.

Mladic, who dissented from Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's decision to comply with NATO demands to withdraw artillery from around Sarajevo, may hope to preserve his reputation as a shrewd general and an uncompromising hardliner by absenting himself at this crucial time.

Those speculating that Mladic has been restrained, perhaps even detained, by Milosivic suggest two reasons the Serb leader might have decided to rein in the ultranationalist general.

One is simply because of Mladic's implacable opposition to withdrawing from around Sarajevo. The other is that he is opposed to an alleged secret agreement between Serbian leaders and the Bosnian government to partition Bosnia, leaving only 49 percent of the country in Serb control.

Both Bosnian Serb and Serbian leaders have vehemently denied in recent days that any such accord exists.

Commentary on Consequences of NATO Air Strikes

AU1909200095 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 16 Sep 95 p 5

[Commentary by Vlado Knezevic: "Sarajevo—Magnet for Thunderbolts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It appears that the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic—RS] is moving guns 20 km away from Sarajevo and that NATO's deadly air strikes, which have wreaked bloody havoc throughout the RS, have been suspended for at least 72 hours. Whether they will be resumed will be decided by the aforementioned military alliance, which has free hand for its deadly technological games, the games that Western television stations are showing euphemistically as clean computer games.

Banja Luka has become a big refugee center. It has accepted another group of 50,000 refugees, in addition to those who came from Krajina about one month ago. Real life, the life of people, and not percentages, represent the existential and psychological trap for the thousands of homeless people. NATO bombs had been raining on the eastern part of the RS for several days. The "cloud" has also significantly affected the western part of the Serb Republic. All this was exploited by the

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Army of Croatia, the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], and the Muslim army. Information on the extent of the destruction of the RS is still hazy, but the destroyed communications and bridges and the attacks on the infrastructure, without which there is no normal life, are indicative. The fact that the consequences are still not known renders this even more serious. This fact also indicates that the very being of the RS has been affected. All this means that the military power of the RS that is used to defend its right to influence the political future of the Serbs in Bosnia—and this, and the final entry into the negotiating process, had been the second most important trump card in resisting the Muslim unitarism—has been more than seriously shaken.

As always, the motive for putting once again the RS "outside the law" was Sarajevo, the media, military, and negotiating magnet of opposing views on the Bosnian future and the "appellant" for the most powerful thunderbolts that have hit Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo was the reason for starting and ending the bombing of the almost entire RS, and it represents more clearly than even before the umbilical cord of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Sarajevo today represents the main chip in the "game." For the Muslims, the "destrangulation" of the city is the driving force of the endeavor to make it the capital city of the territory shared with the Croats, territory that may perhaps be even greater than 51 percent, or to make it the capital of a unitary Bosnia (something they have always wanted). For the Muslim government, this represents an opportunity to perhaps, sooner or later, take control of the whole of the city and of the negotiations. For the Serb Republic, the Serb part of the city is a pawn for the division of Bosnia, as well as a trump card in the negotiations about territorial and internal solutions. This is also the key of the answer to NATO's ultimatums regarding the withdrawal of RS guns to 20 km away from the city. Had this not been the case, the Serbs would have not been given the ultimatum. The pacification of the area would have happened through negotiations on equal footing in the presence of an arbiter.

Regarding the Serb side, there are two certain things. It had been known even before the bombing that the Western military alliance would work very hard for the opponent, and that it would not leave any room for agreements. This is known and this represents an ugly political reality. What is also certain is that the Serbs are divided into two camps that will reexamine the most recent past. Regardless of the fact that the Serbs do not like ultimatums and injustice, two theses will inevitably appear (and they already exist) on how to interpret the events of the past two weeks that will certainly tailor the future. The first purports that the ultimatum should have been met immediately, as the price of the refusal and the demand that all sides be treated equally was enormous. The other will argue that no one (in view of the secret memorandum between the United Nations and NATO) can say that the acceptance of one ultimatum would have not immediately been followed by another. At present, it is also certain that the guns are being pulled back and that Sarajevo has indeed "played" the role of the trump card in the Bosnian war, and also on the path to stopping the war.

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